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ABSTRACT

Dynamic spectrum access enabled by cognitive radio networks are envisioned to drive
the next generation wireless networks that can increase spectrum utility by opportunistically
accessing unused spectrum. Due to the policy constraint that there could be no interference
to the primary (licensed) users, secondary cognitive radios have to continuously sense for
primary transmissions. Typically, sensing reports from multiple cognitive radios are fused
as stand-alone observations are prone to errors due to wireless channel characteristics. Such
dependence on cooperative spectrum sensing is vulnerable to attacks such as Secondary
Spectrum Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks when multiple malicious or selfish radios falsify
the spectrum reports. Hence, there is a need to quantify the trustworthiness of radios that
share spectrum sensing reports and devise malicious node identification and robust fusion
schemes that would lead to correct inference about spectrum usage.
In this work, we propose an anomaly monitoring technique that can effectively capture anomalies in the spectrum sensing reports shared by individual cognitive radios during
cooperative spectrum sensing in a multi-channel distributed network. Such anomalies are
used as evidence to compute the trustworthiness of a radio by its neighbors. The proposed
anomaly monitoring technique works for any density of malicious nodes and for any physical
environment. We propose an optimistic trust heuristic for a system with a normal risk attiiii

tude and show that it can be approximated as a beta distribution. For a more conservative
system, we propose a multinomial Dirichlet distribution based conservative trust framework,
where Josang’s Belief model is used to resolve any uncertainty in information that might
arise during anomaly monitoring. Using a machine learning approach, we identify malicious
nodes with a high degree of certainty regardless of their aggressiveness and variations introduced by the pathloss environment. We also propose extensions to the anomaly monitoring
technique that facilitate learning about strategies employed by malicious nodes and also
utilize the misleading information they provide.
We also devise strategies to defend against a collaborative SSDF attack that is
launched by a coalition of selfish nodes. Since, defense against such collaborative attacks is
difficult with popularly used voting based inference models or node centric isolation techniques, we propose a channel centric Bayesian inference approach that indicates how much
the collective decision on a channels occupancy inference can be trusted. Based on the measured observations over time, we estimate the parameters of the hypothesis of anomalous and
non-anomalous events using a multinomial Bayesian based inference. We quantitatively define the trustworthiness of a channel inference as the difference between the posterior beliefs
associated with anomalous and non-anomalous events. The posterior beliefs are updated
based on a weighted average of the prior information on the belief itself and the recently
observed data.
Subsequently, we propose robust fusion models which utilize the trusts of the nodes
to improve the accuracy of the cooperative spectrum sensing decisions. In particular, we
iv

propose three fusion models: (i) optimistic trust based fusion, (ii) conservative trust based
fusion, and (iii) inversion based fusion. The former two approaches exclude untrustworthy sensing reports for fusion, while the last approach utilizes misleading information. All
schemes are analyzed under various attack strategies. We propose an asymmetric weighted
moving average based trust management scheme that quickly identifies on-off SSDF attacks and prevents quick trust redemption when such nodes revert back to temporal honest
behavior. We also provide insights on what attack strategies are more effective from the
adversaries’ perspective.
Through extensive simulation experiments we show that the trust models are effective
in identifying malicious nodes with a high degree of certainty under variety of network and
radio conditions. We show high true negative detection rates even when multiple malicious
nodes launch collaborative attacks which is an improvement over existing voting based exclusion and entropy divergence techniques. We also show that we are able to improve the
accuracy of fusion decisions compared to other popular fusion techniques. Trust based fusion
schemes show worst case decision error rates of 5% while inversion based fusion show 4% as
opposed majority voting schemes that have 18% error rate. We also show that the proposed
channel centric Bayesian inference based trust model is able to distinguish between attacked
and non-attacked channels for both static and dynamic collaborative attacks. We are also
able to show that attacked channels have significantly lower trust values than channels that
are not– a metric that can be used by nodes to rank the quality of inference on channels.

v
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we will discuss some background on the concepts of cognitive radio networks,
vulnerabilities associated with protocols that lead to threats, the salient contributions of this
dissertation along with the benefits and finally the organization the dissertation.

1.1

Cognitive Radio Networks

Radio spectrum allocation and management have traditionally followed a ‘command-andcontrol’ approach. Regulators like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the
United States allocate spectrum to specific services under restrictive licenses. The restrictions specify the technologies to be used and the services to be provided, thereby constraining the ability to make use of new technologies and the ability to redistribute the spectrum
to higher valued services. These limitations have motivated a paradigm shift from static
spectrum allocation towards a more ‘liberalized’ notion of dynamic spectrum management
in which secondary networks/users (non-license holders) can ‘borrow’ idle spectrum from
those who hold licensees (i.e., primary networks/users), without causing harmful interference to the latter– a notion commonly referred to as dynamic spectrum access (DSA) or
open spectrum access [1]. It is envisioned that DSA networks enabled with cognitive radio
1

(CR) devices [2, 3] will bring about radical changes in wireless communications that would
opportunistically exploit unused spectrum bands. However, the open philosophy of the unmanaged/unlicensed spectrum makes the cognitive radio networks susceptible to events that
prevent them from communicating effectively. Just like traditional radios, cognitive radios
are not only susceptible to interference but also need spectrum assurance. Unlike traditional
radios, cognitive radios constantly monitor the spectrum and intelligently share the spectrum
in an opportunistic manner, both in licensed and unlicensed bands. The most important
regulatory aspect of these networks is that unlicensed cognitive radios must relinquish their
operating channels and move to another available channel as soon as they learn or sense the
presence of a licensed user on that channel [4].
As spectrum is made available to unlicensed users, it is expected that all such
users will follow the regulatory aspects and adhere to the spectrum sharing and access rules.
However, the inherent design of cognitive radios exposes its configuration options to the
controlling entity in an effort to make the operational parameters flexible and tunable. As
a consequence, the reconfigurability and adaptability features open up avenues for manipulation as well. Moreover, problems arise when regulatory constraints are not followed. Also,
learning features of the cognitive radios can be manipulated. A radio can be induced to
learn false information by malicious or selfish entities, the effect of which can sometimes
propagate to the entire network. It is apparent that the inherent design, flexibility and
openness of opportunistic spectrum usage have opened avenues of attacks and made cogni-
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tive radio networks susceptible to various genres of vulnerabilities including non-compliance
of regulations.
The vacancy or occupancy of primary user’s signal is known as channel occupancy
status. This can be assessed through local spectrum sensing by each CR node. However, due
to typical wireless channel impairments like signal fading, multipath shadowing, a standalone radio’s local sensing cannot always infer the true occupancy status of a channel. Hence
radios participate in cooperative spectrum sensing [5, 6], where an inference on the occupancy
status of a channel is made after fusing multiple local sensing results advertised by various
CR nodes.

1.2

Vulnerabilities In Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

Cooperative spectrum sensing can be vulnerable when some malicious nodes share false
local sensing reports to others. In such cases, the fused decision may be altered, hence
jeopardizing the reliability of cooperative spectrum sensing. Such phenomenon where local
sensing result is manipulated is known as Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) [7, 8]
or Byzantine attack. A malicious radio can advertise ‘occupied’ as ‘ available’ inducing a
policy violation or advertise ‘available’ as ‘occupied’ causing denial of spectrum usage. In
adversarial, military, and heterogeneous competitive networks such actions are not surprising
where an adversary wants to cripple the operation of others in the network. Apart from this,
there are also cases where a node’s permanent spatial orientation is such that its reports are
3

not suitable for use by other nodes. The adversary may vary its attack strategies based on
different objectives. Hence there is a need to evaluate the trustworthiness of radios before
considering their local spectrum sensing reports. A trust aware selection of cooperative
cognitive radios can filter out spurious information and preserve the correctness of spectrum
occupancy inference. Moreover, identification or isolation of such malicious nodes are also
required for policy enforcement and liability assignment. Appropriate criterion needs to be
designed for identification and banning of malicious nodes.

1.3

Contributions of this Work

In this work, we provide an anomaly monitoring technique for distributed DSA networks
where binary spectrum sensing results on multiple channels are shared [9]. The anomaly
monitoring technique gathers evidence that is able to indicate cooperative or dishonest behavior of CR nodes. The anomaly monitoring technique is able to capture anomalies of
malicious nodes which employ various attack strategies where nodes might also collaborate
to launch such attacks. The monitoring technique is based on predicting the bounds on
the received power using received signal strength lateration and spatio-spectral geometry of
CR nodes and primary transmitters, while preserving location privacy requirement of CR
nodes. We provide an analytical model of improving the monitored evidence using long-term
information on channel occupancy statistics [10]. We propose Observed Invert Sequence as
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an extension that facilitates important functions like learning the attack pattern of malicious
nodes and propose a way to utilize misleading information provided by malicious nodes.
Based on the evidence gathered from the anomaly monitoring technique, we propose
different trust models that differentiates between honest and dishonest nodes with a high
degree of certainty and preserve accuracy/integrity of cooperative spectrum sensing. First,
we propose an optimistic trust heuristic inspired from an approximation of a Beta distribution model [9] that assigns a trust value between 0 and 1 to all neighboring CR nodes.
We also provide a second measure that quantifies confidence on the computed trust value
given imperfect monitoring or incomplete information. The combination of optimistic trust
heuristic and confidence is used to rank nodes in terms of the quality of spectrum sensing
data they provide. Subsequently, we propose an optimistic trust based fusion scheme using
the optimistic trust heuristic as a criterion to filter out sensing reports from potentially untrustworthy nodes [9]. The proposed trust based fusion works better than blind fusion for
both collaborative and non-collaborative SSDF attacks.
Using the optimistic trust heuristic, we provide a log-weighted trust metric that can
effectively distinguish between malicious and honest nodes. Using a combination of the
log weighted trust metric and observed invert sequence, we propose an intelligent inversion
based fusion schema [11] where instead of excluding sensing reports of malicious nodes, we
utilize their misleading information to the advantage of the network. We observe significant improvement in cooperative sensing performance from blindly fused spectrum data
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or exclusionary approaches that disregard information from malicious nodes or isolate such
nodes.
We propose various types of SSDF strategies on multi-channel systems and quantify
two types of attack measures. We investigate how they affect the utility of CR network
employing majority voting for fusion. In particular, we show that trust values do indeed
reflect how aggressive a malicious node is.
We provide a conservative trust model for a more conservative system with a higher
risk attitude using logic of uncertain probabilities (subjective logic), and Dirichlet distribution. We discuss a machine learning approach that uses conservative trust values to
effectively identify and distinguish between malicious and honest nodes regardless of type of
pathloss environment, how aggressive a malicious node is, or the density of malicious nodes
in the network, all of which affect the monitoring outcome. We also propose a conservative
trust based fusion similar to the optimistic trust based fusion for disregarding untrustworthy
reports. Additionally, nodes in network may engage in on-off attacks where a malicious node
may initially build a high reputation by behaving honestly and then behaving maliciously
later. Such sudden changes in behavior cannot be captured quick enough using traditional
weighted moving averages. As a solution to this, we propose an asymmetric weighted moving
average scheme for quickly identifying on-off attacks.
Finally, we provide a Bayesian inference based trust framework that indicates how
much the collective decision on a channel’s occupancy can be trusted, in presence of selfish
nodes who collaboratively modify occupancy reports on preferred channels. Then we show
6

that the framework is generic enough to be extended to any cooperative decision making
system.

1.4

Benefits of this Work

Our work provides key insights into multi-channel attack strategies and salient concepts on
trust and reputation scoring in the context of SSDF attacks in DSA networks.
Our framework gives accurate results under collaborative SSDF attacks even when the
fraction of malicious nodes is high which is a significant improvement from voting based or
entropy divergence techniques. Our framework also takes care of the difficulties faced by voting based mechanisms when all participating nodes may not be in the primary transmitter’s
coverage area. The proposed schemes are applicable on different pathloss environments.
The proposed reputation based framework does not need location information of CR
nodes thereby preserving location privacy and obviating the possibility of location falsification at the same time. Location privacy is even more important in a CR network to guard
against various RF manipulations, primary user emulation attacks, and belief manipulation.
Our channel centric Bayesian framework that quantifies trustworthiness of spectrum
decisions is very generic and can be extended to any cooperative decision making system for
quantifying decision reliability under imperfect monitoring and adversaries.
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1.5

Organization of the Dissertation

The dissertation has been organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the preliminary concepts
related to DSA networks and their associated vulnerability and security issues. Chapter 3
discusses the preliminary background on trust metrics, reputation systems, SSDF attacks,
and some open issues on trust and reputation scoring in secondary DSA network. Chapter 4, discusses our anomaly monitoring technique using bound prediction on received power
to gather evidence that indicate presence of anomalous reports. We also discuss special
monitoring extensions to the technique which is later used for exploiting the misleading information. Chapter 5 discusses the optimistic trust heuristic for a system with normal risk
attitude and the disadvantages of using such a model for a conservative system. We also
propose a conservative trust model that can also include effect of uncertainty in collected
evidence. Chapter 6 discusses how trust computation from each of the models are applied for
malicious node identification, robust information fusion and resilient reputation management
of nodes. Chapter 7 discusses a channel centric Bayesian inference framework for defending
against collaborative selfish nodes who launch SSDF attacks with channel preference. Chapter 8 gives a comprehensive discussion on the results obtained via simulations. Chapter 9
concludes this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2: CRNs AND VULNERABILITIES

In this chapter, we discuss architectural aspects and key operational weaknesses that introduce avenues for manipulation by adversaries. Then we categorize and classify different
types of vulnerabilities and security threats in DSA networks. We discuss the threat models
and various possible attack strategies that are relevant to this dissertation.

2.1

Architectural Aspects and Operational Weaknesses

Before we discuss the vulnerabilities of DSA networks, let us first present the architectural
aspects of cognitive radios. In particular, we focus on the cognitive functionalities and the
architectural aspects of the network that make them prone to different genres of attack.
A typical cognitive radio consists of a sensor, a radio, a knowledge database, a learning
engine, and a reasoning engine. A cognitive radio continuously learns from its surroundings
and adapts its operational parameters to the statistical variations of incoming radio frequency (RF) stimulus [2]. The objective is to select a set of parameters based on knowledge,
experience, cognition, and policies, in such a way so as to produce outputs that optimize
some objective function. An architectural overview of the cognitive engine, input parameters, observable metrics, policies and objective functions is shown in Fig. 2.1. In the cognitive
9

domain, knowledge or cognizance is obtained from awareness of surroundings, based on input
statistics from sensory observations and other network parameters.
Objective Fn
Dials

Knobs
Frequency of
Operation

Cognitive Radio Engine

Occupied Bands

Reasoning Engine

Knowledge

Signal Strength

Power
Base

Learning Engine

Waveform

Neighbour list

Policies

Figure 2.1: Architectural overview of cognitive radio

Cognitive radios usually have a programming interface that exposes the configuration
options to a controlling entity. The controlling entity could be the service provider that deploys the cognitive radios (base station, access point, etc.) who needs to frequently change
the operational parameters– for example, the operating band, access policies, transmission
power, and modulation schemes [12, 13]. As it is rather impractical to have physical connections with the cognitive radios, the programming of the radios is usually done over-the-air.
In the absence of an infrastructure, there might not be any controlling entity and therefore
the programming capability could be limited.
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2.2

Main Operational Aspects

Local Spectrum Sensing and Local Decision: Cognitive radios have to decide on the vacancy
of channels before using them [2, 3, 12]. So the radios scan for presence or absence of primary
transmission over multiple channels. The easiest and most cost-effective form of sensing the
primary’s presence is energy detection [14]. This process is termed as local sensing as it is
done by a stand-alone cognitive radio.
The local sensing result on a channel may be represented as raw energy values. A
radio deciding on the vacancy compares this energy detected on a channel with a threshold;
if energy is greater than the threshold, the channel is inferred to be ‘occupied’ (represented
as 1) by a primary or a secondary; else it is inferred as ‘empty’ (represented as 0). Hence for
a cognitive radio operating on a multi-channel spectrum, the local sensing result is either a
binary vector of 1’s and 0’s known as hard local decisions.
Collaborative or Cooperative Sensing: In collaborative and cooperative spectrum sensing,
radios share their sensed information with others; hence the level of cooperation has a direct
effect on the efficiency of resource usage. This is because all radios are exposed to typical
wireless characteristics like signal fading and noise which may result in wrong inference [5].
To reduce the level of uncertainty, cognitive radios often employ cooperative spectrum sensing, [6], [15], [16], [17], [18], where the spectrum decision is based on a fusion of opinions
provided by a number of radios in the network. The fused spectrum decision is known as
global decision. The common assumption for sending local sensing results is over a common
11

control channel. Sharing hard local decisions have also been in focus due to less cost and
bandwidth requirements.
• In an infrastructured CR network, the local sensing results are sent to the central fusion
center (FC) which combines the local results in accordance with a suitable fusion
technique. If hard decisions are shared, the popular fusion techniques are plurality
voting or majority voting etc. If soft decisions are shared, the FC compares each value
with the common network threshold to convert them into a vector of 1’s and 0’s. Then
it applies one of the fusion techniques. The fusion center decides on the vacancy and
allocation of channels.
• In contrast, in the distributed ad hoc mode, the local sensing results are advertised to
all neighbors within a certain sharing radius. A radio fuses the local sensing results of
it’s neighbors. The process of fusing data from other radios usually entails cooperation,
and thus collaborative or cooperative sensing is usually employed. Usually a common
control channel and a transmit power is agreed upon for advertising local sensing
results.

2.3

Categories of Vulnerabilities in Cooperative Spectrum Sensing

There is always a difference (both temporal and spatial) between the collected data and
the result of the fusion. Such dependence on information from other radios makes the
collaboration vulnerable to malicious radios which could provide misleading data. Moreover,
12

such spectrum usage sharing might indirectly reveal the location information of a radio
violating its location privacy rights. However, measures on preserving the location privacy
in cooperative spectrum sensing have been proposed in [19].
We classify the various categories of vulnerabilities into three categories; objective of
attackers, impact on victims, and nature of manipulation.

2.3.1

Objective of adversarial attackers

The objectives of an attacker have a direct correlation with the way the attacks are launched,
and therefore they determine the nature of attacks. Hence we classify dishonest nodes or
dishonest behavior into the following two types:

• Selfish Attacks: The attacker’s motive is to acquire more spectrum for its own use by
preventing others from competing for the channels and unfairly occupying their share.
In this type of attack, adversaries will defy the protocols and policies only if they are
able to benefit from them.

• Malicious Attacks: The attacker’s only objective is to create hindrance for others and
does not necessarily aim at maximizing own benefits. They do not have any rational
objective and defy protocols and policies to induce losses to others.
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2.3.2

Impact of attack on the victims

• Direct Attack: In direct attacks, the objective of the adversary is denial or refusal of
communication or service whenever possible. An example would be to somehow make
the radio believe that primary incumbent is present, when in-fact the primary is not
present. This is a classical example of denial of service attack where honest cognitive
nodes are denied authorized access. Another example is jamming them by sending
interfering signals on a channel agreed upon by a transmitter-receiver pair for data
communication. We discuss several subclasses of such attacks in the Section 2.3.3.1.
• Induced Attack: In induced attacks, the attacks are related to policy violation and
breach of regulation. There is usually a significant delay between the actual execution
of the attack and its effect on the victim. It often has serious legal consequences as
the effects are associated with breach of regulations and agreements. For example,
inducing unauthorized spectrum access through a policy violation by making a radio
believe that the primary is not present when in-fact the primary is present, thus causing
a regulatory violation.

2.3.3

Nature of manipulation

Based on the nature of manipulation there can be the following categories of threats:
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2.3.3.1

Sensory manipulation

As obvious from the term, the attack is done in such a way that sensors those sense the
presence of primaries are provided with misleading information. Spoofing faulty sensor information will cause the radios to make incorrect decisions about spectral occupancy and may
select configurations or set of parameters that provides sub-optimal performance. Primary
user emulation attacks is an example of sensory manipulation where the sensors perceive a
spoofed signal that resemble the signal of a licensed user and is led to believe that spectrum
is not available for use. This type of attack can be quickly launched and therefore is a type
of immediate denial attack.

1. Direct sensory manipulation: Malicious nodes may alter sensory input statistics in
such a manner so as to deny communication opportunities to others. For example, a
malicious node can simply emit spurious signals with signal properties similar to that
of a primary incumbent thereby impersonating the presence of the primary incumbent.
Thus, a sensor would fail to detect the spectrum vacancy even when the primary is
not transmitting.
2. Induced sensory manipulation: Here, the sensory input is altered to make a sensor
fail to identify the presence of the primary. This can be done by a variety of ways
like raising the noise floor, masking signals, and advertising lower signal to noise ratio
values during cooperative sensing. All these will make a radio believe that the primary
is not present and will be tempted to use the channel which will induce interference to
15

the primary. While the effect of interference is immediate, a radio may be banned after
repeated occurrences of such induced interference. Thus, there is a time lag between
the time of execution of the attack and its effect to take place.

2.3.3.2

Belief manipulation

This type of attack can be aimed at procedural and ontological cognitive radios that use
learning and experience. The radios learn to associate the temporal and spatial characteristics of the channel occupancy that are faulty. Another example would be that an attacker
can introduce a jamming signal whenever a cognitive radio device switches to higher modulation rates, thus forcing it to operate on lower modulation rate. It is led to believe that
switching to higher modulation rate causes interference and it employs lower data rates, and
may never try higher data rates, given the past experience.
1. Direct belief manipulation: This attack is closely related to cooperative spectrum
sensing, where multiple radios may lie about their opinion on spectral occupancy. If
such modified opinions are shared, the fusion outcome is wrong. Obviously the severity
of such manipulation depends on how a node fuses the information. The secondary
spectrum data falsification attack is an example of a direct belief manipulation in which
spurious occupancy information is sent to honest radios.
2. Induced belief manipulation: Here the learning radios associate wrong temporal and
spatial characteristics of the RF environment and orient their functionalities and con16

figurations to an operating state that results in a sub-optimal performance. As radios
employ learning algorithms, case-driven memory and case-based learning, spurious inputs pollute the inference and knowledge base significantly. So when the learning stage
is affected, the decision phase is also affected. For example, few dynamic spectrum access algorithms gather channel access statistics for PUs in an attempt to predict when
the channel will be idle [20]. If attackers keep spoofing modified occupancy information
on a channel, it will affect the long term behavior of the radio.

2.4

Secondary Spectrum Data Falsification (SSDF) or Byzantine attacks

A Byzantine failure or an SSDF attack in secondary networks [8], [21], occurs when dishonest
attackers lie or modify secondary spectrum sensing data, which may cripple the fusion center
or individual radios who are unable to correctly determine the status of primary’s presence.
This attack exploits the cooperative nature of spectrum sensing where an attacker sends
false spectrum data to the fusion center or data collector, thus inducing erroneous decisions
on spectral usage. There are three ways in which a Byzantine attack can be launched.

1. Denial SSDF: The adversary may advertise 0 (not occupied) as 1 (occupied) thus
causing the fusion/channel allocation center to believe that primary is present, thus
restricting channel access. This attack comes under both short term and denial attack,
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as interpreting empty spectrum as occupied means that a radio cannot use the spectrum
with immediate effect.
2. Induce SSDF: The adversary may advertise 1 as 0 thus causing harmful interference
to primary incumbent. Repeated occurrence of such breach of policies may cause
the radio to be barred temporarily or banned permanently from the network. Since
repeated occurrence of this instance is necessary, it is a long term or induce attack. This
is distinct from the previous case which was a denial attack and is achieved quickly.

2.5

SSDF Attack Strategies

Attack strategies are dictated by many factors and these factors are often interdependent.
They include the following:

• The extent of aggression of a dishonest node, or the amount of damage it wants to
inflict.
• The goals or objectives it seeks to achieve through dishonest behavior.
• Whether multiple dishonest nodes collude or not while modifying local spectrum sensing reports.
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2.5.1

Magnitude of attack

The magnitude of attack defines the level of aggression of a particular dishonest node. The
value of magnitude of attack represents the short term or long term fraction of channels
the dishonest nodes falsifies upon. It may be noted that very low magnitude of attack may
not affect the network’s operations significantly, while very high magnitudes of attack may
facilitate easy detection. More details on magnitude of attack are given in Chapter 4.

2.5.2

Collaborative vs. non-collaborative strategies

1. Non-Collaborative SSDF: The dishonest nodes do not agree upon the channels they
choose to attack. Each malicious node launches independent attack.
2. Collaborative SSDF: The dishonest nodes agree upon the subset of channels they attack. It increases the chances of circumventing the fusion rule and may be more effective form of attack under certain conditions. However, collaboration among malicious
nodes increases cost of attack and requires synchronization. Usually the nodes agree
upon the set of channels to attack.
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2.5.3

Malicious vs. selfish nodes

1. Malicious SSDF nodes: This strategy is employed, when the objective of malicious
nodes is to inflict maximum possible damage to the other nodes. These nodes are
not seeking to increase their own benefit by getting more spectrum or some specific
channels. This type of SSDF strategy may be collaborative or non-collaborative and
magnitude of attack should be at least enough to nullify the robustness of global fusion
rules.
2. Selfish SSDF nodes: Usually employed by dishonest nodes who are seeking to maximize
their own benefit or looking to gain access to some specific candidate channels. Hence
such dishonest nodes only lie on channels of interest. In such case, the attack is usually
collaborative. A classic example of a collaborative selfish SSDF attack is a group of
nodes belonging to a certain network provider which wants access to some selected
channel(s); hence all nodes belonging to that provider send false information for those
channels while truthfully reporting on all other channels in order to remain undetected.
Magnitude of attack in such cases is usually lower than malicious nodes.

2.5.4

Random on-off attack

A malicious node may try to defeat the trust or reputation management algorithm by behaving cooperatively initially for a certain length of time and building its reputation. A period
20

of no attack is known as OFF period. Then the node would attack for a certain period of
time known as ON period where magnitude of attack on each time slot is random. Then
it would again behave cooperatively to regain any possible loss trustworthiness in the ON
period. It is usually difficult to detect malicious nodes with such alternating behavior unless
the trust management algorithms employs special measures.
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

In this chapter we discuss the state of the art research already done in the relevant field.
First, we discuss salient concepts related to trust and reputation definitions in the literature.
Then provide a comprehensive list of related research solutions regarding defense against
spectrum sensing data falsification also known as byzantine attacks.

3.1

Background on Trust Reputation and Recommendation

The original concept of trustworthiness has its origins in human society known as social
trust– a qualitative way of saying whether a person is reliable based on previous or current
observations. This idea has been extended to the realm of distributed and networked systems
where entities are analogous to humans and interactions exist between them. This idea
has led to the concept of computational trust a quantitative measure of trustworthiness
for interactions between entities in a network. The notion of trust is contextual and its
meaning varies according to the applications and services they are associated with and hence
quite challenging to define as it manifests itself in many different forms. In the following
subsections, we present the commonly used definitions of trust and reputation.

22

3.1.1

Trust

Trust is can be broadly defined in a number of ways:
Reliability trust: Trust is the subjective probability by which an individual entity
A (trustor), expects that another entity B (trustee) performs a given action on which its
welfare depends. (Gambetta [22]). However, having high reliability trust on an entity B is
not a sufficient condition to enter into a position of dependence on that entity (Falcone et.al.
2001). For example, it is possible that the value of damage in case of failure is too high to
choose a given decision branch, and this independently either from the probability of failure
(even if it is low) or from the possible payoff (even if its high). In other words, given the
same trust value T , two different systems S and S ′ may view it differently as the associated
risk may be too high for one particular system S enough to act as deterrent to enter into a
state of dependence. On the other hand, another system S ′ may have less associated risk
with it, in case of a failure and hence may agree to enter into a state of dependence. The
amount of risk that a system is ready to take is often termed as risk attitude, and plays a
key role in how trust metrics are interpreted for decision making. For this we need a broader
concept of trust provided by decision trust.
Decision trust: Decision Trust is defined as the extent to which an individual entity
A is willing to depend on the information provided by another entity B, with a relative feeling
of security even though negative consequences are possible. In particular, it can be represented
as a particular expectation with regard to the likely behaviour of other entities [22].
23

This definition is more generic than the previous definition and accommodates the
relative contextual vagueness associated with interpretation of trust for different kinds of
systems. In general, decision trust is often associated with a threshold, below or above
which a decision on the fitness of an agent’s input is decided.

3.1.2

Categories of formal trust metrics

Representation: This type of trust metrics assigns a trust value to each entity from a
generic range of values on the real number axis bounded by the upper and lower limits. The
lower the value the less trustworthy any entity is. Higher values indicate more trust. These
values may be bounded between +100 and −100 [23], 0 and 1 [24], or −1 and +1 [25]. The
values can be discrete or continuous.
Subjective probability: Trust is expressed as a subjective probability between 0 and 1
and the assigned values are continuous. This implicitly means that the probability that an
trustee will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to trustor is high
enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation. Such a probability is usually
conditioned over the data or evidence available, trustor’s assessment of the situation, and
distinct to the trustor in question; hence it is subjective. This probability is inspired from
Bayesian statistics where a probability at a particular time is treated as prior for future
update of the current posterior. Another property that accompanies subjective probability
representation of trust for systems where trust evolves over time is the Cromwell’s rule.
24

Cromwell’s rule suggests the prohibition of assigning of an absolute 0 and 1 as trust because
if the prior probability is 0 or 1, then according to Bayes’ theorem, the posterior probability
is forced to be 0 or 1 as well; no evidence, however strong, could have any influence on
the posterior. This is improper for a system where Bayesian inference is used based on
incremental evidence over time.
Logic of uncertain probabilities (Subjective Logic): This representation is the most
popular for systems where some kind of ignorance or uncertainty exists. This model of trust
representation is widely known as Josang’s belief model. Trust is particularly relevant in
conditions of ignorance or uncertainty with respect to unknown or unknowable actions of
others. The condition of ignorance or uncertainty about other people’s behavior is central
to the notion of trust [22]. The logic of uncertain probabilities is an amalgamation of probability distributions and degree of uncertainty associated in monitoring the interactions in
the system and the advantage is that this allows to incorporate ignorance or uncertainty in
the analysis. Josang’s belief model uses a quadruplet termed as opinion to express all components about the interaction with an agent namely trust, distrust, uncertainty and relative
atomicity. Then an expected opinion is used as the expected trust value or belief given the
uncertainty in evidence. An opinion includes the concepts of disbelief and ignorance in addition to belief itself [26]. Another advantage of this model compared to earlier representations
is that it allows the trust computation module to control the expected opinion value (expected trust value or expected belief) depending on how a specific system views ignorance
and how it decides uncertainty would contribute towards belief or disbelief. Mathemati25

cally opinion is represented as ω = (b, d, u, a) where the components represent degrees of
belief, disbelief, uncertainty, and relative atomicity respectively; where {b, d, u} ∈ [0, 1] such
that b + d + u = 1, and the expected opinion E(ω) known as degree of trust incorporating
contextual uncertainty is represented as

E(ω) = b + au,

(3.1)

The relative atomicity a ∈ [0, 1] decides the extent to which the degree of uncertainty
contributes to E(ω). In cases of absence of any prior statistical information, a is the reciprocal
of the total number of possible situations that can be modeled, also known as frames of
discernment. For e.g., if we are trying to find whether a node in a network is malicious or
not, there are two frames of discernment, hence a = 0.5 assuming no other information is
available on that node. Similarly, if we were to deal with expectation of the outcome of
rolling a dice, a = 61 , due to six possible frames of discernment in a die, given additional
information is not available about the dynamics of this particular die.

3.1.3

Reputation

Unlike trust which typically models reliability between two parties, notion of reputation does
not necessarily involve binary parties and can represent a multinomial nature of interactions
with multiple parties. For. e.g., if we want to know the reputation of an entity the result
may be good, bad, average, excellent, neutral– a notion typically different from the binary
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concepts. The term reputation can be loosely defined as, “what is generally said or believed
about a persons or entity’s character or standing. It is a combined measure of trustworthiness
as seen by all other entities interacting with a particular trustee. The concept of reputation is
closely linked to that of trustworthiness, but it is evident that there is a clear and important
difference [27]. The differences lie in their multinomial nature and the essence of a long
term collective measure of trust. Notion of reputation is usually associated when nature of
interactions, referrals or ratings about an entity are shared over a long period of time or multi
hop information for the network is available. In a broadcast media where same information is
injected to everyone, the reputation of an entity B as seen by all entities in its neighborhood
should converge to the trust that exists between entity B and a particular entity A within
its neighborhood. For the purpose of this work, we can summarize Reputation as the long
term average trust value of an entity as experienced by the overall network.

3.1.4

Applying trust and reputation for cooperative decisions

The application of trust for a particular cooperative decision is a essentially a binary concept,
in the sense that whether an entity is going to accept or not accept, the information provided
by the other interacting entity. Trust is also used for classification problems that are binary
in nature, viz. fit or unfit, malicious or not malicious, allowed or banned etc. Reputation on
the other hand is not necessarily a binary concept and may be applied for a variety of uses
viz. making policy changes, learning about strategies employed by different users, resource
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recommendation and provisioning. Recommendation is usually given based on the trust and
reputation value that indicates the fitness of an entity towards a decision or sorting entities
in order of their quality of contribution to the system.

3.2

Literature of SSDF Attack Remedies

Let us discuss the various techniques proposed so far to deal with SSDF attacks.

3.2.1

CatchIt: Heuristic onion peeling approach

‘CatchIt’ is a technique that helps preserve the correctness of spectrum decision in collaborative spectrum sensing even in the presence of multiple malicious nodes [28]. This heuristic
can be described as an “onion peeling approach”, where the possibility of a node being malicious is calculated in a “batch-by-batch basis”, i.e., suspicious levels of all nodes involved
are calculated at every time slot, and if at some point the suspicious level is greater than a
certain threshold then that node is deemed to be malicious. The centralized decision center
excludes the information from that particular node. The process is repeated until there are
no more malicious nodes. Another paper [29] almost similar to [28], discusses the suspicion
levels of different nodes using a Bayesian detection approach that progressively eliminates
users based on past reports. It also proposes a consistency value that provides stability to
variations in the suspicion levels assuming the presence of only one malicious node.
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3.2.2

Weighted sequential probability ratio test

Robust distributed spectrum sensing is a method to ensure that the final spectrum decision is
not affected by byzantine attacks when multiple nodes participate in collaborative spectrum
sensing in the presence of a centralized decision maker [8]. There are two issues that are
considered for robust fusion. (i) Ensure bounds on both false alarm and missed detection
probabilities and (ii) consider the previous history of behavior of individual sensing terminals.
The first issue is taken care by a weighted decision variable derived from the WSPRT [30, 31],
(originally known as Abraham Wald’s SPRT) where the weight of the decision variable is a
function of the reputation. The second aspect is taken care by reputation maintenance where
the previous behavior of a terminal is incremented or decremented based on the decision
variable. Weighted SPRT uses weights over decision variables to account for reputation
based on observed behavior. The final decision depends on whether the weighted decision
variable is within the tolerable limits of false alarm and missed detection probabilities. For
each secondary node i, its reputation ri is set to zero initially. The most recent sensing
report sent to fusion center is ui and the final decision at the fusion center is u. At any
stage, the reputation of node i is updated as

ri ← ri + (−1)ui +u
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(3.2)

The idea of the hypothesis step is derived from sequential probability ratio test where the
following likelihood ratio is modeled as a classical sequential ratio decision variable as:

Sn =

n
Y
P [ui |H1 ]
i=0

P [ui |H0 ]

(3.3)

where H1 is the hypothesis that spectrum is occupied, H0 is the hypothesis that spectrum is
unoccupied and n is the number of sample observations. The traditional decision variable is
then modified to include the previous reputation of nodes and the weighted decision variable
Wn is calculated as
n
Y
P [ui |H1 ] wi
Wn =
(
)
P [ui |H0 ]
i=0

(3.4)

where weight wi is a function of the reputation of node i; wi = f (ri ). The decision variable
is then compared with two predefined thresholds to get a final decision. The thresholds
denoted as η1 and η0 are functions of the tolerated false alarm probability and the tolerated
missed detection probability. Comparison of Wn with these two thresholds determines the
final robust decision u. If Wn is greater than η1 , the final decision is u = 1. If Wn is less
than η0 , then u = 0. For all other cases, it is necessary to take another observation. Given
that the probability of final decision being true is greater than 0.5, a sensing radio with
more accurate local sensing report has a higher expected reputation value. Hence attackers
with inaccurate spectrum results will have a lower reputation value. We observe that the
Weighted SPRT in [8] and Wald’s SPRT discussed in [30, 32], are based on the same concept,
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but in this paper the concept is modified by putting a weight on the sequential probability
ratio which captures the previous activities/reputation of a radio.

3.2.3

Abnormality detection using double sided neighbor distance algorithm

Catching attackers with the help of a technique popularly used in data-mining called the
k-proximity algorithm has been proposed in [33]. This considers a single channel system with
secondary nodes in presence of a central data fusion center and non-collaborative malicious
nodes. The proposed algorithm finds outliers that lie far apart from most secondary users
in the history space. If the history of behavior if too close or too far to other histories, then
an aberrant behavior is inferred.

3.2.4

Two-tier optimal cooperation based secure spectrum sensing

A distributed spectrum sensing algorithm is presented in [34] that aims to mitigate each of the
two types of attacks namely PUEA and SSDF attacks. For PUEA, a user verification scheme
on localization based defense is proposed. For SSDF a non-linear cooperation scheme which
considers M −ary hypothesis, where M is the number of primary transmitters, is proposed.
As opposed to the works in [8, 33], this paper introduces the concept of a 2-tier hierarchal
centralized cognitive radio network, in order to optimize the energy and bandwidth consumed
as well as decrease the computational complexity. Since reporting by a large number of
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secondaries results in high computation, energy, and management costs, such optimizations
are necessary. Thus special relay nodes which collect and compress local spectrum sensing
help reduce costs.

3.2.5

KL divergence based defense

In [21], an analysis of collaborative and non-collaborative Byzantine attacks derived from [35]
is presented. The paper aims to analyze the optimal attack strategies as well as issues
of collaborative byzantine attacks with a dedicated fusion center, where Kullback-Leibler
divergence (KL distance) is used as an objective function which malicious nodes seek to
minimize. Given the probabilities of missed detection, false alarm, and the probabilities of
true reporting for honest as well as malicious nodes, the paper provides the optimal fraction
of malicious nodes required to make the fusion center incapable of making a correct decision.
The aim of the malicious nodes is to introduce an error in the global decision on spectrum
occupancy. The probability distribution function for the event that fusion center decides the
result (j=0/1) on the hypothesis that PU is present (or absent) is calculated and denoted
as Xj (or Yj ). Both of them are functions of the fraction (α) of malicious attackers in the
system. The relative entropy or KL distance is a non-symmetric measure of the difference
between the two distributions X and Y and is denoted by: D(X||Y ) =

P

X

j∈0,1

Xj log Yjj . The

attackers attempt to reach a state where D(X||Y ) is zero, which is achieved for the optimal
fraction of attackers. Subsequently, the paper discusses the best possible strategy for all the
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entities namely the Byzantine radios, honest radios and the fusion center. The interaction
between them is modeled as a minimax game between Byzantines and fusion center and the
best strategy for both players is the saddle point. The interaction is analyzed in light of
two different performance aspects namely, the KL distance and probability of error. The
saddle points in the context of KL distance for both independent and collaborative Byzantine
attacks are derived.

3.2.6

Majority voting based exclusion with long term reputation

A method proposed in [36] counters Byzantine attacks over a number of sensing periods, by
accumulating the local decisions from each radio, and comparing it with the final decision at
the fusion center in the same time window. The number of times the local decision from a
radio is different from the final decision at fusion center is used as a reputation measure for a
radio. If the reputation measure is lower than a certain threshold the radio is isolated from
the fusion process. The methodology assumes the usage of ‘l-out-of-K fusion rule’ where
final decision on a channel is decided what at least l out of K participating radios advertise.
However, if the fraction of attackers is high, the fusion center cannot distinguish correctly.
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3.2.7

Bio inspired consensus based cooperative sensing scheme

In [37] a scheme that is derived from bio-inspired consensus algorithms is utilized for a
consensus based cooperative sensing scheme in an ad hoc cognitive radio network to counter
SSDF attacks or Byzantine failures. The lack of a central authority makes ensuring security
difficult as certain local information when spoofed impacts the radio behavior rather easily.
In this method, RF statistics from immediate neighbors are used as state variables which are
aggregated to deduce a consensus variable. The consensus variable is then used to make the
decision over the detected energy and determine the presence or absence of the primary. The
sensing scheme works in the following fashion. All secondary nodes sense the spectrum and
report their locally estimated energy level to their neighbors. With the gathered information,
a node uses a selection criterion to exclude reports from nodes that are likely to be attackers.
At any time instant, the exclusion/selection process uses the mean value of energy at the
previous instant and compares the mean value with individual values from the neighbors.
For a particular node, the set of neighbors whose reports suffer maximum deviation from
the mean are excluded and the remaining nodes’ reports are taken into consideration. This
process of sharing, receiving, selecting, and updating continues until all states converge to
a common value which is then compared with a certain threshold. If the common value is
greater than the threshold, the spectrum is occupied else it is not occupied.
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3.3

Motivation for this Work

Even though some advances have been made to deal with vulnerabilities in cooperative spectrum sensing there are certain deficiencies in the current body of research which motivate the
ideas behind this work. Moreover, there is very little body of work for distributed networks
where binary opinions (hard-decision) on channel occupancy are shared during cooperative
sensing. Outlier detection or voting based techniques might not work well compared to blind
non-filtered fusion if a node fusing reports has more malicious nodes in its vicinity. (i.e., a
higher local density of malicious nodes). In such cases, the fusion center does not have the
accurate knowledge of ground truth as shown [21, 36]. Such techniques are also less robust
to collaborative SSDF attacks where malicious agree upon channels they falsify. Another
disadvantage of current majority voting based exclusion model is that they might infer a
legitimate node as malicious simply because it is outside the reception radius of the primary
transmitter.
Other important issues related to location privacy requirements and node identities
have not been adequately addressed while defending against SSDF. Also realistic physical
environments and their effects over the monitoring and trust models have not been discussed.
Most designs consider single channel systems, although multi- channel local sensing results
are shared usually shared among nodes. Almost all the existing work considers sharing of raw
energy values during cooperative sensing although in recent times, sharing of binary opinions
for local channel occupancy has been emphasized due to increased control channel bandwidth
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costs. Furthermore, past works do not take into account the temporal aspect of SSDF
attacks or malicious nodes having different levels of aggression on a multi-channel system.
Hence there is a need to address the problem of establishing trustworthiness, malicious
node identification and robust information fusion under SSDF attacks that (i) work in a
distributed CR network, (ii) share multi-channel binary occupancy vectors, (iii) preserve
location privacy requirement, (iv) consider local density variations of malicious nodes to
be high, (v) works for varying levels of aggressiveness of dishonest nodes, (vi) remain valid
under varying pathloss environments, and (vii) address situations where all neighbors do not
legitimately view the primary transmission equally.
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CHAPTER 4: ANOMALY MONITORING TECHNIQUE FOR
SSDF ATTACKS

This chapter proposes a node centric anomaly monitoring technique based on which trustworthiness of a particular node is computed. The proposed method is then extended to
consider noisy control channels which potentially affects the local sensing reports for all
nodes. Finally, we discuss an extension which is used for utilizing misleading information
and learn about the strategies of malicious nodes.

4.1

System Model and Assumptions

In this section, we describe the system model and assumptions. We present the threat model
and SSDF attack strategies.

4.1.1

System model

We assume that secondary nodes undergo spectrum sensing and determine whether a channel
is occupied by primaries or not. A secondary node i constructs its observed occupancy vector
i
as: Bact
= [b1 , b2 , · · · , bn ], where bk is 1 or 0 depending on whether the channel k is decided
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as occupied or unoccupied and N is the number of channels being monitored. A decision is
made by comparing the energy sensed on channel k with a common normalization threshold
γth . If sensed energy is more than γth , channel k is marked as 1 signifying ‘occupied’ and
vice-versa.
Once this binary vector is created, a secondary node would broadcast this information
to its neighboring nodes. Similarly, a secondary node would also hear broadcast messages
(binary occupancy vectors) from its neighbors. The cooperation of binary vectors takes
place over a common control channel which may be on licensed or unlicensed band [5, 16].
Based on the received vectors, a node will employ a fusion technique (e.g., majority voting)
to obtain a better estimate about the spectrum usage that can significantly improve the
performance of spectrum sensing [6, 8]. Such cooperative sensing has other benefits such as
mitigating the shadowing and multi-path effects. We assume all nodes transmit through a
common control channel while advertising its binary vectors during cooperative sensing and
hence have equal transmission power agreed upon for signals sharing binary vectors. We
make the following assumptions:

• We consider an ad-hoc secondary CR network with N nodes with γmal fraction of
nodes being malicious; H denotes the set of honest nodes and M the denotes the
set of malicious/dishonest nodes. The secondary network has no dedicated central
fusion center, and each individual node fuses the spectral sensing data it receives from
other nodes from which it can hear from and forms its opinion on the availability
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of spectrum. The nodes then use any collision aware channel access framework for
accessing spectrum from the pool of available channels.
• Nodes need not be aware of the geographical coordinates of other nodes which addresses
location privacy demands and eliminates possibility of location falsification. Moreover,
in a heterogeneous network with different operators, maintaining location information
is an added overhead.
• Transmit power for advertising local sensing reports is equal. This assumption is valid
since sensing reports are sent over a common control channel with each node having a
fixed sharing radius. Knowledge of the transmitter output power, channel losses, and
antenna gains with the appropriate path loss model allows us to find distance between
the two nodes using Received Signal Strength (R.S.S) through R.S.S lateration [38, 39].
We only harness the distance information for our work and not location information.
• Each primary transmitter whether it chooses to transmit or not, transmits only on one
channel; so the channel associated with a primary transmitter is known. The primary
transmitter is assumed to be a transmitter like TV tower or a stationary cellular base
station. For cellular primary network, this approach is applicable for downlink primary
channels. This is because in a cellular network, the source for the uplink channels may
be mobile. In such cases, there has to be location information available for such mobile
primary receivers. However, most of our work is associated with TV towers or downlink
channels of wireless base stations.
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• Primary transmitter that transmits on channel k, is referred as Tk , and since it is fixed,
its coordinates of a primary (xTk , yTk ) are known to the nodes.
• Outcome of sensing at a node are raw energy values which are converted into a binary
vector of 0’s and 1’s, where 0 represents absence of primary and 1 represent primary’s
presence. This is known as hard-decision sharing of cooperative spectrum data.
• There is negligible noise between two secondary neighbor nodes while transmission of
binary occupancy vectors over the control channel.
• The nodes use a majority voting fusion to fuse all binary vectors from its neighbors
within a sharing radius. Unlike in [33], which discusses a very restrictive fusion model
(AND fusion rule), we use majority voting fusion rule, which gives better flexibility
towards errors committed by nodes and/or malfunctioning nodes. This approach has
been proved to effective in many voting based defense research.
• We do not assume that all neighbors of a node are necessarily within the coverage area
of primary transmitters.
• The probability of false alarm is the probability that a channel which is actually empty
(H0 ) is erroneously detected by a node to be occupied, and is denoted by Pf or
P (H1 |H0 ). Similarly, the probability of missed detection is the probability that a
channel which is occupied (H1 ) is not detected by a node and is denoted by Pm or
P (H0 |H1 ). These are traditionally for the channel between the primary and the CR
node. There is body work that deals with calculation of such probabilities [40].
40

4.1.2

Threat model

Malicious nodes may have different levels of aggression. A very aggressive attacker risks
itself to easier detection, while a less aggressive attacker hardly effects the network in a
significant manner. Thus the level of aggression is often a choice between how much time a
malicious node wants to remain undetected, while inflicting maximum damage to the other
nodes. Intuitively, a smart attacker may not attack on the same number of channels or the
same channel sets on all time slots. The level of aggression of malicious nodes which we call
magnitude of attack is reflected by the value of the proposed attack measures discussed next.

4.1.3

Attack measures

• Probability of Attack (Pattack ): A malicious node falsifies report for a random number
of channels every time slot, and channels falsified upon are also random. However, the
nodes follow a long term mean number of channels that are attacked. The value of
this mean is denoted as Pattack , which depends on how aggressive the malicious node
is. Hence for a system of N channels, Pattack = 0.70 means that the probability of any
channel occupancy status being altered is 0.70.
• Intensity of Attack (Iattack ): A malicious node falsifies the report for a fixed number
of channels every time slot. However, channel IDs falsified on are randomized every

41

time slot. The fraction of channels falsified on every time slot is defined as intensity of
attack and denoted by Iattack .

If the nodes want to play a perfect mixed strategy in a anti-coordination game, the
optimal attack strategy is when Iattack or Pattack is 0.5. More aggressive attackers have attack
magnitude greater than 0.5 and more conservative attackers have attack magnitude less than
0.5. It may be noted that very low magnitude do not affect the network significantly while
extremely high magnitude facilitates easy detection; hence for practical purposes we ignore
the two extremes. We also subject our system to both types of attack and observe their effects
to report which is a better attack strategy from the attackers perspective. A smart malicious
attacker will randomize attacks on different channels and different number of channels.

4.1.4

Attack strategy: Collaborative and non-collaborative SSDF

• Malicious nodes are said to launch a collaborative SSDF if such nodes also agree upon
the channel IDs they decide to falsify. The advantage of such a strategy is that the
probability of compromising the voting based fusion rule increases. For example, if a
node has 5 neighbors out of which 3 are malicious falsifying on the same channel, a
majority voting based fusion rule is bound to fail. For collaborative SSDF, the member
channels of the channel set chosen for attack on each time slot is the same, although
the set may itself change over time. The channel set is a subset of the total number of
channels in the operating spectrum. The disadvantages of a collaborative SSDF is that
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it may be costly and time consuming and may not return good results if two nodes
collaboration do not sense the same channel status on a channel it intends to falsify.
If the channel set remains same over time, it is called static collaborative attack, else
it is called dynamic collaborative attack.
• In independent SSDF attacks malicious nodes do not collaborate on the channel sets
they falsify.
Our node centric anomaly monitoring mechanism is not dependent on the type of strategy
employed. The proposed method works well regardless of the SSDF strategy employed unlike
other works discussed in the related work.

4.2

Anomaly Monitoring Mechanism

In traditional wireless ad-hoc networks, examining packets forwarding is a common method
for monitoring aberrant behavior and track malicious or selfish nodes for trustworthy and
secure routing [41]. The successes and failures of such interactions are treated as evidence
and is subsequently used for trust modeling or identifying possible malicious intent. In the
context of cooperative spectrum sensing in CR networks, we need to monitor anomalies
in spectrum sensing data reported among the nodes participating in cooperation. Such
anomalies can reveal incidence of spectrum data falsification attacks. The presence of such
anomalies forms the basis of identifying the possible dishonest/malicious nodes, building
trustworthiness, and then finally making the sensing mechanism more secure and robust.
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We pursue this by predicting the bounds on received power levels over a channel for a
particular neighbor node and then applying a normalization criterion over predicted bounds
to obtain a predicted vector for occupancies. Each node calculates a predicted occupancy
vector for its neighbors. Then we compare predicted occupancy with the vector actually
advertised by a neighbor. Any mismatches between the predicted bounds on occupancy and
the actual advertised vector is recorded as an event of an anomalous or non-cooperative
behavior. The event where bounds on prediction matches the advertised vector is a recorded
as occurrence of a match. The relative frequency of such matches (or relative absence of
anomalies) given the total number of interactions on multiple channels over several time slots
is a measure of how much trustworthy a node is. It is obvious that if the relative frequency
of anomalies are higher subject to appropriate conditions, the trustworthiness of that node
will be less and vice-versa. The formulation of gathering the evidence or observation data for
trust computation is divided into the following parts: predicting bounds on received power,
normalization criterion to map bounds into predicted occupancy vector, and comparison of
predicted occupancy vector with advertised vectors. The comparison yields a data set which
we call as trust evidence or observation counts. These terms are used interchangeably. A
comprehensive list of notations used in this chapter is listed in Table 4.1.
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Symbol
Ni
H
M
γth
sTik
bk
j
Pi
i
Bact
i
Badv
ij
Ppredict
Bij
bjk |inf er
(α, β, µ)j
Ej,i
T BF i
4.2.1

Table 4.1: Notations
Meaning
Neighbor set of node i
Set of honest nodes
Set of malicious nodes
Common threshold used to normalize power vectors
Distance between node i and primary tower Tk for channel k
Binary Decision on a channel k, bk ∈ 0, 1
Set of all neighbors of i, j ∈ Ni
Measured power vector on n channels at node i
Actual binary occupancy vector formed at i
Advertised binary occupancy vector by node i
Vector of power ranges for neighbor j predicted by i
Binary occupancy of node j, predicted by i
Predicted decision on any channel k, for Bpj
Three tuple trust evidence
Trust of neighbor j calculated by node i
Fusion result Based on selective inclusion of j based on trust

Predicting bounds on received power

Suppose node i measures the power vector

P i = {γ1i , γ2i , · · · , γni },

where γki is the power received (sensed) on channel k and n is the total number of channels.
i
Each node i forms its binary occupancy vector Bact
=



bi1 , bi2 , ....bin



from it’s power vector

P i by comparing γki with threshold γth , where

bik




 =1



 =0

when γki ≥ γth
when
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γki

< γth

(4.1)

Bact is the actual binary report constructed by an individual CR node using a common
i
network threshold γth . Each node i, advertises a public binary vector Badv
such that,

i
Badv




i
 = Bact



i
 6= Bact

if node i ∈ H

(4.2)

if node i ∈ M

where H and M denote the sets of honest and malicious nodes respectively. Just like node
i advertises its binary vectors to others, it also hears similar advertisements of binary occupancy vector from its neighbors. For a neighboring node j ∈ N i , node i estimates the
bounds on possible received power on all channels using their mutual distances, its received
signal strengths and known location of fixed primary towers. The mutual distance between
the node i and its neighbor node j, can be calculated using received signal strength (RSS)
localization or lateration [38, 39]. Assuming a generic propagation model for path loss, it is
trivial to find the distance of a transmitter node given knowledge of transmit output power,
antenna gains, transmit-receive side losses when the transmit power levels are same. The assumption on having equal transmit power while sharing binary vectors is reasonable because
a broadcast message on spectrum data is shared within a common sharing radius through a
control channel. Hence the transmit power for sharing vectors is same for all nodes. We use
the following generic model for received signal in [39]:

RXpwr = T Xpower − P LT x−Rx + Ω
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(4.3)

where, RXpwr is the received signal strength when a potential neighbor transmits with known
power T Xpower . Given the knowledge of transmit power, losses, and gains represented by Ω,
we calculate the pathloss P LT x−Rx . We plug-in this value in Eqn. 4.4, and solve for d to find
the mutual distance.
P LT x−Rx = P L1meter + 10log(dω ) + f

(4.4)

where d is the distance between transmitter (neighbor j) and receiver (node i) which needs
to be found; f is a constant for shadow fading; P L1meter is the near field reference power and
ω is the pathloss factor. The calculated P LT x−Rx from Eqn. 4.3 can be used in Eqn. 4.4 to
get the desired estimated distance between the receiver and its transmitter. This distance
is the distance between node i and its neighbor j which transmits binary occupancy vector,
and is denoted by sij such that d = sij .
The distance sij allows us to plot a circular area around the location of the monitoring
receiver i, with radius of sij . This circle is the locus of node j, and the neighboring node’s
location can be anywhere on this circle. We draw a straight line from the center of the circle
to the primary transmitter Tk located at (xTk , yTk ) as shown in Fig. 4.1. Using geometry it is
easy see that point H is the closest distance and point L is the largest farthest from (xTk , yTk )
to the circular locus of j. Under such conditions, the RSS due to Tk will be maximum on
the point of the circle that is closest to Tk , i.e., on point H and minimum at a point L that
is farthest from Tk . We denote the power levels at these two locations as [γkj ]high and [γkj ]low
at distances sjmin ,k and sjmax ,k , respectively. For all locations on the circle whose distances
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are between sjmin ,k and sjmax ,k , the RSS on channel k is bounded between [γkj ]high and [γkj ]low .
This forms our bounds on received power on a channel k for a particular neighbor j.
Locus of Neighbor j
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Figure 4.1: Maximum and minimum RSS on channel k for neighbor node j

The calculation of [γkj ]high and [γkj ]low is done as follows: Using commonly used models
for modeling the primary signal propagation [42, 43, 44], we have

γki = Pk ×
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A2
;
sωik

(4.5)

where, γki is the sensed energy detected on channel k at node i for a primary transmitter Tk ,
A = frequency constant, ω is path loss factor, sik is the distance between primary tower Tk
and node i, and Pk is the transmit power of Tk . Usually, A =

λ
4π

where λ is wavelength of

light. From Eqn. 4.5, we get Pk which is used to get the bounds on possible received power
due to the primary’s transmission (see Fig. 4.1) as:

[γkj ]high = Pk ×

[γkj ]low = Pk ×

A2
sωjmin ,k

A2
sωjmax ,k

;

(4.6)

;

(4.7)

Now we divide the Eqn. 4.5 by Eqn. 4.6 and Eqn. 4.7 to find [γkj ]high and [γkj ]low ,
respectively, since sik , sjmin ,k , sjmax ,k and γki are known to node i. Node j may be anywhere
on the circular locus. Thus the predicted power vector of node j is a 2-tuple vector
ij
Ppredict
=



([γ1j ]low , [γ1j ]high ), ([γ2j ]low , [γ2j ]high ), ......, ([γnj ]low , [γnj ]high )



For most cases, the distance between primary and a secondary node is larger than the
distance between two secondary nodes which are neighbors. However, in the unlikely event
that a primary transmitter is in close proximity to a secondary CR and its neighbor, the
calculation of sjmin ,k and sjmax ,k is slightly different. Such a situation is depicted in Fig. 4.2.
In such a case, the line joining the node i and the location of primary yields distance sik .
This line when further extended in the same direction meets the locus of neighbor j at point
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H which is the nearest location on the locus from (xTk , yTk ). This yields sjmin ,k and the
corresponding lower bound of received power [γkj ]high is calculated using Eqn. 4.6. The same
line when reflected 180 degrees will meet the locus of neighbor j at point L which forms
the corresponding furthest distance yielding sjmax ,k . This distance is used to calculate [γkj ]low
using Eqn. 4.7.
Locus of Neighbor j
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ij

Node i
s
j min , k

s
ik
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s
j

max

,k

Figure 4.2: Calculation of maximum and minimum RSS on channel k for neighbor node j
when Tk is between located between i and j
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4.2.2

Normalization criterion for predicted occupancy

With the estimated power vector known, the inference drawn by i for neighbor j on channel
k is,

bjk |inf er





0 if both [γkj ]low and [γkj ]high ≤ γth ;




=
1 if both [γkj ]low and [γkj ]high ≥ γth ;






 X otherwise

(4.8)

where X denotes that no inference could be drawn. Eqn. 4.8 gives the normalization criterion.
When both the lower and higher predicted power levels on a channel are less than normalizing
threshold γth , it implies that channel k is not being used by any primary transmitter, i.e.,
channel is unoccupied. So in this case bjk |inf er is inferred as 0. When both the lower and
the higher predicted power levels on a channel are more than normalizing threshold γth , it
implies that channel k is being used by a primary transmitter, i.e., channel is occupied. In
such a scenario, bjk |inf er is inferred as 1. In the event, where one power level is higher and the
other is lower than γth , no inference can be drawn on that channel at hence it is marked as
X. Usually we have to wait for future observations for a concrete inference on that channel.
Though our discussion with respect to single node i, the analysis is applicable to all
other nodes as well. Hence we drop the suffix i from our notations.
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4.2.3

Formation of trust evidence

The predicted occupancy vector, given the mutual distance between nodes i and j, is given
as
j
Bpre
= [bj1 |inf er , ......, bjn |inf er ];

bjk |inf er ∈ 0, 1, X

(4.9)

j
j
Now node i compares Bpre
= [bj1 |inf er , ......, bjn |inf er ] with received Badv
= [bj1 , ....bjn ] on
j
corresponding channels for matches and mismatches. The comparison of Bpre
with received
j
Badv
= [bj1 , .., bjk ..bjn ] for each channel is done and the results are recorded using the criterion

in Eqn. 4.10. After this comparison, all matches are denoted as α, mismatches are denoted
j
as β, and channels with value X in Bpre
are recorded as µ denoting undecided. If Qjk is the

result of the comparison, then




αj if bjk |inf er = bjk ;




j
Qk =
β j if bjk |inf er 6= bjk ;






 µj otherwise

(4.10)

The total number of matches, mismatches and undecided for each node j is denoted as ηαj ,
ηβj and ηµj such that ηαj + ηβj + ηµj = n. This 3 tuple vector forms the trust evidence.
αj is a treated as a positive rating, βj is a negative rating, and µj is a neutral or uncertain
rating. More number of positive ratings relative to the overall number of ratings indicates
more positive behavior and vice-versa. The number of neutral ratings increases or decreases
confidence on estimates as we discuss in Chapter. 5.
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4.3

Fairness under Noisy Control Channels: A Special Case

We have to distinguish mismatches caused due to malicious behavior and mismatches that
may be caused due to noise. Hence we propose a fairness model to discount the effects of
mismatches that may be caused due to channel errors.
To account for channel noise, shadowing and fading, we define the probability of false
alarm as Pf = P (H1 |H0 ), probability of missed detection as Pm = P (H0 |H1 ), and channel
error probability due to noise as Pe .
Pf and Pm are due to inherent channel induced sensing inaccuracies when nodes are not
able to detect the presence or absence of primary transmission. Moreover, when local sensed
reports are advertised to the neighbors, they may be altered due to noise between two CR
nodes. Considering the channel error probability, we define modified false alarm probability
for node j at node i as
′

Pf e = (1 − Pf ) · Pe + Pf · (1 − Pe )
and modified missed detection probability, as

′

Pme = (1 − Pm ) · Pe + Pm · (1 − Pe )

′

Pf e is the probability that a 0 in node j ′ s advertised vector will reach as 1 at node i,
′

irrespective of malicious behavior of node j. Similarly, Pme is the probability that a 1 in
node j ′ s advertised vector will reach as 0 at node i, in spite of any malicious behavior. We
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need to discount these mismatches caused by Pm , Pf and Pe to achieve a fair trust coefficient.
idealj

Let the actual number of 0′ s and 1′ s in ideal case for any received vector be x0

idealj

and x1

respectively. Let the number of 0′ s and 1′ s in received vector from j be H(0)received and
H(1)received , which are known. Therefore,

idealj

− Pf e × x0

idealj

− Pme × x1

x0

x1

′

idealj

= H(0)received

(4.11)

′

idealj

= H(1)received

(4.12)

idealj

idealj

From Eqn. 4.11 and Eqn. 4.12, we find x0

and x1

, the other parameters being known.

The total number of mismatches from ideal scenario caused due to channel uncertainties and
noise is
′

idealj

Pf e × x0

′

idealj

+ Pme × x1

j
= αnoise

(4.13)

j
where αnoise
accounts for the mismatches that occur due to unreliable channels conditions.
j
This αnoise
will additionally play a role alongwith ηαj , ηβj , ηµj . We argue that under noisy
j
channels and when the channel statistics are known, a deviation of αnoise
on average is

expected from the ideal case.

4.4

Special Monitoring Extensions for Intelligent Decision Making

In this section we propose certain extensions to the already discussed monitoring mechanism
that help us in making intelligent operational decisions. We propose to record the channels
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on which mismatches occur for neighbor j as a vector known as Observed Invert Sequence
and denote it by IS j,i . This would throw light on important information about learning
whether there is pattern in the attacks from two discrete nodes, or if there is preference
on certain channels that are attacked more. Such information can aid in understanding the
rationale of attackers. Moreover, we use this vector to propose a method where we can utilize
misleading and spurious spectrum data to the advantage of the CR network. For this, the
only modification we need to make is in the Eqn. 4.10, where the channels on which β is
encountered is added to the set ISij .





α if bjk |inf er = bjk ;




j
Qk =
β if bjk |inf er 6= bjk and ISij ← k;






 µ otherwise

(4.14)

The Eqn. 4.14, is an extension that would help in inclusive learning based approach towards
robust and secure network operations in CR networks.

4.5

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed an anomaly monitoring technique for a distributed CR network with malicious byzantine nodes that launch SSDF attacks. The anomaly monitoring
technique builds trust evidence or observation counts. This trust evidence has three types
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of observation namely a match, mismatch and undecided. Our proposed model will be used
in the following chapters for computing trust of nodes. We also distinguished between mismatches that may be caused due to channel noise as opposed to mismatches introduced due
to malicious behavior. Finally, we proposed the concept of invert sequence vectors capturing
channels on which mismatches are detected, for subsequent intelligent operational decisions.
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CHAPTER 5: TRUST MODELS

In this chapter, we propose models for computing trust and reputation of nodes based on the
observed evidence from the anomaly monitoring phase. We incrementally build our trust
models from the simplest to the most advanced depending on the potential requirements
and objectives of the network. The first model proposed is for a normal CR system that is
risk neutral. This model known as Optimistic Trust Model (or Model I), is useful when the
focus is not on identification or isolation of malicious nodes but only filtering out spurious
sensing reports from featuring in spectrum data fusion. We also propose a modification
of the optimistic trust model through evidence coarsening and show that it approximates
the expectation of a beta distribution. The advantage of such an approximation is that
while giving similar trust values as optimistic trust model, the other moments like variance,
confidence intervals, skewness etc can be easily calculated. It also helps in confirming with
some established trust metrics. Finally, we propose a Dirichlet distribution framework based
trust model (Model 2) that is applicable for a conservative system which is risk averse. The
difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is largely in the way uncertainty in evidence is
interpreted.
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5.1

Issues with Quantifying Trust and Reputation in CR systems

For malicious node identification, it is important that entities are long lived, such that sufficient incremental evidence is available. This is more important where the malicious entities
have some form of randomness in their attack strategies. Malicious node identification or
node isolation is not feasible in highly mobile distributed network as neighbors of a node
keep changing or nodes enter and exit the network frequently. Node identification makes
sense for a static network or a network with limited mobility. For other cases, robust fusion
is more natural choice for defense where trust values are used to disregard information from
possible outliers. Given the few number of observations from a particular entity, characterizing its fitness to the network by labeling it as honest or malicious is not feasible. Since
cooperative sensing only concerns immediate neighbors, multi-hop trust propagation popular
is not required. A trust enforcement infrastructure is usually necessary for node isolation
decisions.

5.2

Optimistic Trust Heuristic

To trust or not to trust is a binary concept unlike reputation. Hence we need to map a
ternary evidence into a binary notion. The ‘event’ of observing a ‘match’ is conceptualized
as achieving trustworthiness and a mismatch is treated as a failure to achieve trustworthiness.
To account for the number of channels as X where no inference could be drawn, we split
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them in the ratio ηα : ηβ and add to the number of matches. This assumption is valid
because we assume that there is no preference on channels attacked and channels selected
for attack are uniformly random. Thus the proportion of matches for node j is updated as
η αj +

ηµj
ηαj +ηβ j

× η αj .

The proportion or relative frequency of matches to the total number of channels can
be treated as the instantaneous trust value for node j as computed by node i and is given
by

E j,i =

η αj +

ηµj ηαj
ηαj +ηβ j

η αj + η β j + η µ j

(5.1)

where 0 ≤ E j,i ≤ 1.
The value E j,i is always a value between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 indicate more
trustworthiness and lower values indicate relatively less trust. In general, this process is
repeated over time; hence Etj,i is the trust calculated based on evidence collected on time
slot t.

5.2.1

Computing bounds on trust values and certainty

We analyze the bounds on computed trust values to show how confident we are about the
trust value given by Eqn. 5.1. The computed bounds on trust values provide a confidence
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heuristic called certainty. This becomes particularly important when number of undecided
is high.
The number of µj ’s can have any number of matches or mismatches which is unknown
to the monitoring node. The trust attains a maximum value if all µ’s were matches and a
j,i
minimum value when all µ’s were mismatches. Hence Ehigh
=

ηαj +ηµj
N

j,i
and Elow
=

ηαj
N

respectively for the maximum and minimum case. It is not difficult to see that this interval
j,i
j,i
Elow
, Ehigh
depends on how large µj is. The larger this interval, the lower the probability

of the true relative frequency to be closer to the expected (trust) value and hence lower the
confidence. How large ηµj is, depends on a number of factors like pathloss and the relative
spatial orientation of node pairs to be discussed in Chapter 6.
The chances of the extreme cases that all undecided were all mismatches or matches
over long time is low as there are no preference on the channels attacked. Also, when there
is a change in position of neighbor, uncertainty may be reduced. Since the channels to be
attacked are completely random, the assumption that µ’s are split in ratio of recorded ηαj
j,i
j,i
≤ E j,i ≤ Ehigh
) always holds and the
and ηβ j is justified. Nevertheless, the condition (Elow

interval can be used to sort nodes according to trustworthiness.

5.2.2

Trust and certainty measure

j,i
j,i
Since the larger the interval δ = (Ehigh
− Elow
), the lesser is the confidence, we use 1 − δ

as the certainty metric that defines how much confident we are about E j,i . In cases where
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number of undecided are less, there are more matches or mismatches which make the opinion
about the trust more certain. Hence when we have to assign a trust of node j, where perfect
information is not present, we use certainty to indicate how confident we are about the
evaluation of E j,i . We define certainty as aj,i = 1 − δ. The trust-certainty tuple for neighbor
j is represented as (E j,i , aj,i ).

Scenario
1
2
3

5.2.3

Table
α
14
19
22

5.1:
β
13
18
0

Trust-Certainty tuple; N=40
µ Trust,Certainty Beta Trust
13
0.51, 0.675
0.50
3
0.51, 0.925
0.50
18
1.00, 0.55
0.97

An illustrative example

Let us consider the three scenarios as shown in Table. 5.1. If we compare the first two
scenarios, we see that both of them have the same trust but Scenario 2 has more certainty
or the confidence of the trustworthiness because true observations are known on 37 out of
j,i
j,i
the 40 channels. Scenario 2 has Elow
= 19/40 and Ehigh
= (19 + 3)/40, hence bounds are

(0.475, 0.55) and δ = 0.075 making the interval δ smaller than scenario 1. Hence aj,i =
1 − δ = 0.925 which is higher than scenario 1. Thus, scenario 2 will be more confident and
hence have more priority than scenario 1 even if they have same trust value. In all other
cases, the trust value has the priority in determining relative trustworthiness. Hence scenario
3 is most trustworthy followed by 2 and 1.
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5.2.4

Trust evidence coarsening into a modified parameter Beta distribution

Ternary evidence can be alternatively modeled by coarsening it into a binary space [45] to
make it mathematically tractable with known distributions like the Beta distribution [46].
Beta distribution is used widely for trust modeling where state of evidence is binary. Beta
distribution suggests that if r is the number of positive and s is the number of negative
outcomes of an experiment, then it can be modeled as a Beta distribution with parameters
specified by ϕ = r + 1 and κ = s + 1 with the posterior probability density function given as

f (p|ϕ, κ) =

Γ(ϕ + κ) ϕ−1
p (1 − p)κ−1
Γ(ϕ)Γ(κ)

(5.2)

However, Eqn. (5.2) is of less physical significance for representing trustworthiness [46]. The
mean of the pdf in Eqn. (5.2) can accurately model trust metrics given by

E=

ϕ
r+1
=
ϕ+κ
r+s+2

(5.3)

Following this, we can treat the floor of the numerator of Eqn. (5.1) as the coarsened
number of matches or positive outcomes denoted as αjc and the N − αjc = βjc as the coarsened
number of mismatches or negative outcomes. Given this, the trust value can be modeled as
the expectation of a beta distribution with parameters (αjc + 1, βjc + 1) given as

j,i
Ebeta

αjc + 1
= c
αj + βjc + 2
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(5.4)

where αjc = ⌊ηαj +

ηµj ηαj
ηαj +ηβj

⌋. We can observe from Table 5.1, that Eqn. (5.1) and Eqn. (5.4),

almost give the same value. This observation holds true as we assume the channels chosen
for attack are uniformly random. The advantage of using a Beta distribution inspired expectation is that we can easily calculate all the other moments and error margins and confidence
intervals are standard and known. Also the Beta trust value adheres to the Cromwell’s rule
by preventing the trust value to be assigned as absolute values of 0 and 1. Infact for all
exhaustive combination of values between 1 and N , it gives approximately equal results to
optimistic trust heuristic except for boundary cases where there is total absence of a particular observation (say zero mismatches). The coarsening is usually not recommended if a
system has high uncertainty and associated risk due to failure is high.
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Figure 5.1: Coarsened Beta Trust Value vs Relative Frequency Trust
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5.2.5

Motivation for a more pessimistic Dirichlet recputation based trust

In the design of a more defensive or pessimistic system with a higher risk attitude, splitting
the undecided in the ratio of observed matches and mismatches does not have scientific
basis for nodes with a high number of undecided ratings. For a conservative CR system the
assumption of uniform preference on channels is improper due to the following reasons:
1. Consider a case when channels attacked with some preference on certain channels:
some are attacked more, while others are attacked less. An intelligent adversary might
employ a variety of statistical techniques for its attacks. Hence the channels attacked are
not uniformly random.
2. Furthermore, even if statistical preference is not employed there is a non-zero
probability that all channels which were attacked on were inferred as undecided. Such a
possibility is high when there are a high number of undecided observations in the trust
evidence and channels that were attacked may go undetected due to its relative position
with the monitoring node. Hence trust value calculated in such cases will be far from an
accurate reflection of the true value.
Both the above cases will violate the assumption that µ’s can viewed in ratio of observed matches and mismatches. For example in Table 5.2, we compare two trust evidences
in scenario 1 and 2. According to the trust models discussed this far, both scenarios give
trustworthiness of 1.00 for the optimistic trust heuristic, 0.97 for the beta distribution approach, meaning a high degree of trustworthiness. The trust scoring value E j,i discussed
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thus far does not effectively capture the apparent uncertainty of nodes which do not have
any mismatches, but have a high number of uncertain observations as opposed some node
with lower uncertain observations. In such a case, we need to have a model that differentiates between scenario 1 and scenario 2 through a single trust value without waiting for
convergence etc.
Table 5.2: Optimistic Model Example for high undecided; N=40
Scenario α β µ Trust, Certainty Beta Trust
1
10 0 30
1.00, 0.25
0.97
2
31 0 9
1.00, 0.775
0.97
3
22 14 4
0.61, 0.90
0.60

The approaches discussed this far is not applicable for systems requiring a higher
degree of reliability like mission critical systems. Binomial models are unable to distinguish
in cases where there are high polarized ratings or highly neutral ratings [47], where there is
high occurrence of one particular event which is neither positive or negative.

5.3

Dirichlet Expectation based Conservative Trust Model

Multinomial distribution is the generalization of the binomial distribution with k > 2 possible
outcomes where each trial results in one of the k outcomes from a set of N possible trials.
We can model match, mismatch and undecided as the possible outcomes on the inference
over each channel; hence k = 3. Thus observation counts from the trust evidence fits very
well with concept of multinomial distribution. Given this, observations data D for any node
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can be treated as multinomial distribution given probabilities of occurrence of each outcome
mathematically represented as p(D|X).
Here D is vector representing observed data such that D = {d1 , d2 , d3 }; Similarly,
X represents the probability vector denoting the probability of occurrence of each outcome
such that X = {x1 , x2 , x3 }. In general these are represented as D = {di |1 ≤ i ≤ k} and
X = {xi |1 ≤ i ≤ k}. However initially X is unknown and hence the problem is estimation
of parameters in X given evidence or data D.
Dirichlet distribution effectively captures a sequence of outcomes where number of
possible outcomes are more than 2 [45, 47]. The PDF of a Dirichlet distribution returns
the subjective probabilities xi (also known as degree of belief) for Ki number of rival events
given each possible outcome i has been observed di − 1 times. Given that observation count
di −1 are known from the gathered evidence, we can calculate the probabilities of each event.
Dirichlet distribution is often used as a conjugate prior for a multinomial distribution,
the unknown degree of belief associated with the three events can be calculated assuming
prior and posterior preserve the same form [47]. In Bayesian systems, a prior probability
distribution p(x) is said to be conjugate to the class of distributions p(D|x) if the resulting
posterior p(x|D) are in the same family as p(x). In such a case, the resultant posterior
p(x|D) can be used as prior for further belief updates as incrementally new evidence D over
time is received. For our work, the observation data counts form D and X is the probability
parameter. In short, X is said to have a Dirichlet distribution with parameter D and is
denoted as X ∼ Dir(D).
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Let us discuss the general theory of Dirichlet distribution. In terms of Bayesian
systems, if x1 , · · · , xi , · · · xk are the unknown probabilities associated with k events, and the
evidence is di for event i, then the posterior degree of belief on each event i having accounted
for evidence parameter di is given as p(xi |di ) =

p(di |xi )p(xi )
.
p(d)

The evidence parameter di , is

defined as di = ri +Cai , where ri represent the most recent count for event i and ai represents
a prior base rate and C represents an a-priori constant which dictates whether an informative
or non-informative prior is assumed initially.
The posterior probability density function with variables ~x = (x1 , x2 , · · · , xk ) and
parameters d~ = (d1 , d2 , · · · , dk ) is defined as
P
k
Γ( ki=1 di ) Y di −1
~
f (~x|d) = Qk
xi ,
i=1 Γ(di ) i=1
where x1 , x2 , · · · , xk > 0,

Pk

i=1

(5.5)

xi = 1, d1 , · · · , dn > 0. The relation between observation

parameter di and actually observed outcomes ri is that ri + C.ai = di , where

Pk

i=1

ai = 1 and

C > 0, ai > 0 such that zero occurrence of an outcome preserves the condition that di > 0.
Modeling the trust given the assumptions will be equivalent to the expectation of
the dirichlet distribution. We mathematically justify this later, with a formal mathematical
proof in Section. 7.4. Hence, we denote the trust as given by the mean vector for Eqn. (5.5)
and is given as
~ = P di
E(xi |d)
k

i=1
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di

(5.6)

where di is known as the total evidence count for event i. The degrees of belief associated
with the outcomes are expressed as the mean of each outcome.

5.3.1

Applying Dirichlet model to trust evidence

~ = {d1 , d2 , d3 } and X = {~x} = {x1 , x2 , x3 } : Pk a(xi ) =
We know k = 3, hence D = {d}
i=1
1. In our case, the most recent observation vector is the multinomial trust evidence r =
{ηα , ηβ , ηµ }.
We observe d1 = ηα +Ca(x1 ), d2 = ηβ +Ca(x2 ) and d3 = ηµ +Ca(x3 ). Since there is no
reason to believe a node has a particular pre-disposition to behave in a positive, negative or
uncertain way, we assume a non-informative and hence a uniformly distributed prior. Since
there are 3 outcomes, the prior initial base rate a(xi ) =

1
3

and C = 3. In general, to preserve

our assumption of uniformly distributed a priori, C would be equal to the cardinality of the
state space. If we did not assume a uniformly distributed prior the value of C would have
changed. Given this d1 = ηα + 1; d2 = ηβ + 1; d3 = ηµ + 1. Now that we have the parameters
of the Dirichlet distribution, we can express the expected degrees of belief associated with
the events of match, mismatch and undecided in terms of the observed trust evidence using
Eqn. (5.6) as:

Eα =

ηα + 1
ηα + 1 + ηβ + 1 + ηµ + 1
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(5.7)

Similarly, Eβ =

ηβ +1
ηα +ηβ +ηµ +3

and Eµ =

ηµ +1
.
ηα +ηβ +ηµ +3

b
d
Hence for each node j, we have Eα = Eji
representing degree of belief, Eβ = Eji
u
representing degree of disbelief and Eµ = Eji
reflecting degree of uncertainty associated with

behavior of node j based on gathered trust evidence of node i from the anomaly monitoring
phase.

5.3.2

Interpreting belief as subjective logic for trust modeling

Subjective logic is directly comparable with a binary logic (trust or not to trust), probability
calculus and classical probabilistic logic. Conclusions more correctly reflect actual scenario
when there is ignorance and lack of information, and uncertainties that necessarily result
from partial or uncertain input arguments [26, 45]. It is widely known as Josang’s Belief
Model. The proposition that a node will cooperate is either true or false and hence is a
binary proposition. However, due to inherent uncertainty and imperfect knowledge caused
by lack of evidence it is not possible to infer with certainty that the proposition is true or
false. Hence we have only an opinion about this proposition and trust is often reported as the
expected opinion. This translates the problem into degrees of belief, disbelief and uncertainty
b
d
u
b
d
u
represented by Eji
, Eji
and Eji
, where Eji
+ Eji
+ Eji
= 1. Josang’s belief model is hence

used to deal with such data uncertainty in a proposition with binary state space, but with
multinomial evidence [48] where one of the features express uncertainty. Josang’s definition
of opinion ω = (b, d, u, a) is a quadruple where the components respectively correspond to
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the belief, disbelief and uncertainty, and relative atomicity such that b, d, u, a ∈ [0, 1] and
b + d + u = 1. Then expected opinion pertinent to the positive interaction or belief is given
as
E(ω) = b + au

(5.8)

where a is known as base rate or relative atomicity which determines how uncertainty contributes to the final expected opinion. Since the proposition that a node will cooperate or
not is binary, we treat the value of a as 0.5 which is the value of relative atomicity in our
b
d
u
model and Eji
= b, Eji
= d, Eji
= u. Hence we have expected opinion on the proposition

that the node is cooperative or not is given by

ω
b
u
Eji
= Eji
+ (a)Eji
.

5.3.3

(5.9)

An illustrative example of Dirichlet trust computation

The scenarios in Table 5.3, represent trust evidence on a particular time slot out of N = 40
channels for different nodes. Scenarios 1, 2, and 6 have occurrences of mismatches while 3,
4 and 5 do not. Intuitively, we would expect 3,4, and 5 to have higher trust than 1, 2 and 6.
However, scenario 4 has high number of uncertain ratings as opposed to 5. The previously
proposed Optimistic Trust Model (Model 1) cannot capture effect of relative uncertainty in
one value. Hence E j,i gives the same answer for scenarios 4 and 5. This ambiguity is resolved
by the Dirichlet distribution based model.
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If we observed the corresponding values for the same in the next Model 2, given by
ω
Eji
, we observe that Model 2 captures the presence of high number of uncertain ratings by

generating a trust value of 0.61 for scenario 4, whereas giving a higher value of 0.86 to scenario
5, thus effectively differentiating between scenarios 4 and 5. We can also see that scenario
3 which has less uncertain ratings than 4 but more uncertain ratings than 5, has a trust
value intermediate to the scenarios 4 and 5, thus preserving consistency in the rationale that
given no evidence of mismatch, lower uncertainty should be awarded higher trust. Scenario
7, which has the most number of mismatches has a markedly low conservative trust value
ω
of 0.398. Hence the value Eji
does not have to necessarily depend on the assumption of

uniformly random attacks or the non-zero probability of not detecting a single channel’s
attack.
Table 5.3: Expected
Scenario α
1
14
2
19
3
22
4
10
5
31
6
22
7
14

Opinion and Conservative
j,i
ω
β µ Ebeta
Eji
13 13 0.518 0.5116
18 3 0.513 0.5166
0 18 1.00 0.755
0 30 1.00 0.616
0 9 1.00 0.860
14 4 0.61 0.5929
22 4 0.38 0.398

Trust; N=40
wji
0.045
0.069
0.67
0.38
0.87
0.31
−0.51

For Model 2 to work properly, we should expect that the trust of scenarios 1, 2 and
6 should be lower than that of scenarios 3, 4, and 5. We can verify that from the Table 5.3.
However, among these scenarios where there is evidence of mismatches, scenario 6 has the
least undecided and most number of matches compared to the other two. Hence scenario 6
achieves higher trust value than 1 and 2 but lower than scenario 4.
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However, in future if scenario 4 gives a different result where evidence of mismatch
is experienced then the values of it will change. In summary, we have showed how Model 2
effectively captures our concerns for a more conservative model which can express trustworthiness in a single value which captures not only highly polarized but also relative proportions
of undecided ratings alongwith mismatches.

5.3.4

A Conservative trust weight metric

ω
Eji
is a number between 0 and 1, which is a very narrow interval and makes the separation

between non-trustworthy and the trustworthiness nodes difficult to depict or visualize. So we
would like to make the trust values of the two classes linearly separable so that the malicious
and honest nodes can be identified with a classification threshold with least false alarms and
ω
missed detections. For this, we intend map the trust values to a Eji
to a higher dimension

to make it linearly separable popularly known in machine learning as a kernel trick. We use
ω
the Shapley log scaling equation to transform Eji
to a generic value on the real line where

non-trustworthy nodes have a monotonically decreasing value and trustworthy nodes have
monotonically increasing weights. We then report the final normalized weight by giving a
value between [-1,1]. The Shapley value based weight is given as

rEjiω = log2
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ω
Eji
ω
1 − Eji



(5.10)

The normalized conservative trust weight is given by


−|r ω |


1 − e Eji
if rEji ω > 0;




−|r ω |
wji =
−(1 − e Eji ) if rEji ω < 0;






 0
if rEji ω = 0

(5.11)

where wji ∈ [−1, 1]. For quantifying reputation of a node, performance of node isolation and
plot purposes, we mostly use the absolute value of node j’s final trust rating which is the
average of all trust ratings wji calculated by node j’s neighbors. Hence average trust rating
or the reputation of a particular node j can be represented as wj . All wji corresponding the
ω
scenarios are discussed in Table 5.3. The trends are same as Eji
, but the separation between

the nodes are large and distinct and that will help separating nodes into malicious or honest
with a high degree of certainty as we will show in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6: APPLICATION OF TRUST MODELS

In this chapter, we discuss how the proposed trust models can be applied for different operational decisions to preserve the integrity and security of the network in presence of malicious
nodes employing different intelligent strategies. First, we provide a discussion on how to
use trust models for identification and isolation of malicious nodes with a high degree of
certainty using a machine learning approach. Then we propose an asymmetric weighted
moving average scheme for trust maintenance and management under on-off SSDF attacks.
Then we discuss the use of optimistic and conservative trust models for robust information
fusion at a node. Finally, we discuss inversion based fusion schema- an inclusive approach
which uses observed invert sequence to utilize misleading information of malicious nodes for
the benefit of the network.

6.1

Trust based Malicious Node Identification: A Machine Learning approach

Reputation or trust based systems can be used to identify malicious nodes if there is sufficient
time to observe such nodes. Let at any time, the conservative trust of node j calculated by
a particular neighbor i be represented as wji (t). The steady state value can be expressed as
a moving average by wji . For malicious node identification, we treat the reputation of node
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j as the average of steady state conservative trust values as seen by all its neighbors. This
average is usually done by a policy enforcement entity, who collects the trust weights of node
j from all its neighbors. We denote this average as wj dropping the suffix i. The particular
implementation of how the enforcement entity collects of the individual trust ratings are out
of the scope of this work. We treat wj as the long term reputation of a node j which is used
for malicious node identification.

6.1.1

Need for a learning approach

We need a learning approach because a decision as drastic as declaring a node malicious, isolating a node from the network or reporting policy violation, we have to make sure the model
is general enough and is able to classify for a wide range of scenarios. We seek to propose a
framework that is learned enough to work irrespective of the type of pathloss environment,
topology, and magnitudes of attack. We do so using a machine learning approach, whereby
we simulate training data sets under various values of Pattack and under different pathloss
environments. Our objective is to find an optimal threshold weight wclassif y that can decide
whether a node is malicious or not. We use the concept of support vector machines (SVM)
to identify wclassif y .
Pathloss environment plays a key role in degree of undecided: Apart from spatial orientation,
the pathloss environment plays a key role in determining the inherent uncertainty induced by
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the proposed monitoring technique. In general, for all practical terrains where obstructions
are present, pathloss factors vary from 2.8 to 6 [39].
Through our experiments we see that a network with pathloss factor of 4 (neither high
or low) induces maximum uncertainty, while pathloss factors lower or higher than 4 (say 3
or 5), lowers the average degree of undecided. One possible explanation for this is that since
signals decay too fast or too slow for higher and lower pathloss factors, the chances of both
the Phigh and Plow being either above or below the particular normalizing threshold value
γth within the radius sij is increased. Given that, all the other factors remain same, if the
pathloss factor is neither too high or too low, the chances of both Phigh and Plow being above
or below γth decreases. This is evident from our experiments which calculates the average
degree of uncertainty for all nodes across the network for different pathloss environments
listed in Table. 6.1.
Table 6.1: Effect of pathloss on uncertainty; Worst case Pattack = 0.50
Pathloss Average Eµ
3
0.166065
4
0.426087
5
0.305750
5.5
0.200618

While pathloss factor as low as 3 or as high as 5.5, generates lower average Eµ of
0.16 and 0.20 respectively, an intermediate pathloss factor of 4, produces Eµ as high as 0.42.
Lack of information increases the difficulty of a classification problem. Hence we conclude
that classification becomes harder when pathloss is around 4 and easier when the pathloss
factors are on the extremes. Hence we motivate the need for learning over training sets
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considering different pathloss environments, so that we can find an optimal classification
threshold, that is able to generalize effective classification over a testing set considering a
variety of environments.
Trust or reputation is dependent on magnitude of attack: Our proposed mechanism will
induce trust and reputation values that are directly dependent on the magnitude of attack;
viz. greater the magnitude lesser the trust. An example of this is shown in Fig. 6.1. This is
intuitive since under an effective monitoring mechanism, the more a node attacks the more
it exposes itself and it becomes easy to detect anomalies. However, a malicious node should
have some minimum magnitude of attack that should justify its malicious behavior. What
will be the minimum magnitude of attack for an adversary is an open ended question and
depends on a number of factors. Whatever be the magnitude of attack, our model should
be able to detect such nodes with a high degree of certainty. In general, if we can detect for
lower magnitudes of attack, we can automatically detect for higher magnitudes of attack as
well. Hence lower magnitudes of attack are a limiting factor.
1
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Figure 6.1: Relationship between Trust and Weight
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6.1.2

Choice of training data sets

We use one training set for each pathloss ω = 3, 4 and 5. For each training set we choose
magnitude of attack as 0.5. We initially train with 30 nodes randomly distributed over an
area of 100X100 units, with 30 units of sharing radius. 9 nodes are programmed malicious
and all of which have the same magnitude of attack. We observe the trust values of the honest
and malicious nodes. We run a support vector machine (SVM) over training examples which
maps the trust values into support vectors and finds the optimal hyperplane which in our case
is a single line due to the linear nature of the data with only one feature i.e., the trust value.
In Figure 6.2(a), + represents labels corresponding honest nodes and ∗ represents labels
corresponding to malicious node. The optimal hyperplane is a line which is the output
of the SVM, that maximizes the margin between the support vectors corresponding to the
closest honest and the closest malicious node over the feature space. The optimal hyperplane
for each training set represents a candidate threshold that may be chosen to classify whether
a node is malicious or not. We represent our training sets as Tl = T (ω, Pattack ) where l
represents the lth training set. Hence T1 = T (3, 0.5) is the first training set with pathloss
factor of 3 and magnitude of attack as 0.5 with the attack measure as Pattack . Similarly,
T2 = T (4, 0.5) and T3 = T (5, 0.5). Training results on SVM for T1 , T2 , T3 are shown in
Figures. 6.2(a), 6.2(b), 6.2(c).
We also find the effect of varying Pattack in Fig. 6.3(a) and Fig. 6.3(b) with Pattack = 0.5
and Pattack = 0.8 for network with ω = 3 and fourth training example T4 = T (3, 0.8).
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Figure 6.2: (a) Environment with Pathloss=4; Pattack = 0.50 (b) Environment with
Pathloss=5; Pattack = 0.50(c) Environment with Pathloss=3; Pattack = 0.50

6.1.3

Rationale for model selection

The lower region of the SVM result contains support vectors with labels corresponding to
malicious nodes and the upper region contains labels that correspond to the honest ones.
Now we run a SVM for various environments for Pattack = 0.5. Choosing of thresholds
can be tunable and adjusted according to the requirements of the system. Here we aim
at identifying the training set mimicking the worst case scenario for classification. We do
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not show all the higher probabilities of attack because the classification gets easier as nodes
become more aggressive. If we isolate for a lower magnitude of attack, automatic isolation
for higher magnitude follows.
In Figs. 6.2(a), 6.2(b), 6.2(c), the horizontal line separating the trust domain into
two regions can be considered as the candidate threshold for the relevant testing set. For
designing threshold, we have the following candidate thresholds: (0.42, 0.29, 0.39). We have
two alternatives:
Case 1: A single common threshold: If we wish to design a pessimistic system, with higher
reliability that works regardless all environments and for different magnitudes of attack, we
should choose the training set that represents the worst case in terms of uncertainty in the
trust evidence. Hence we select training set T2 (known as model selection), which has a
pathloss factor of 4 and a Pattack = 0.5. The optimal hyperplane that separates the training
examples of T2 is approximately equal to 0.29. Hence we can treat, wclassif y = 0.29, for
classification of malicious nodes.
Case 2: Different threshold based on pathloss environment: Alternatively, we can have
different thresholds for each pathloss environment. Then different thresholds can be designed
depending on the relevant environment. We can take 0.42 for pathloss 3, 0.29, for pathloss
4, 0.39 for pathloss 5.
We explore both the above options using simulations and performance modeling, and
report which alternative is better.
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Figure 6.3: (a) Environment with Pathloss=3; Pattack = 0.50 (b) Environment with
Pathloss=3; Pattack = 0.80

6.1.4

Choice of testing data sets

For the testing data sets, we assume Pattack is not same for all malicious nodes. We have a
network with 100 nodes where nodes are randomly chosen to be malicious and such nodes
are divided into three groups having a low, medium and high Pattack values of 0.3, 0.5 and 0.8
respectively. The threshold selected from the chosen model in our training should be able to
capture such nodes, under any pathloss factor. The testing set is also a bigger network of
600x600 area with a sharing radius of 200 units. We take results of networks under different
pathloss factors 3.2, 4 and 4.8. We show the performance of the chosen classification model
over these testing sets in the simulation section. Also for most other simulation results, we
keep the pathloss factor of 4, as this represents the worst case from the point of lack of
evidence.
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6.1.5

Trust updates over time

For our given attack model (except On-Off attacks), a cumulative moving average also known
as equally weighted moving average for maintaining node reputation makes sense because in
order to isolate a node we need to keep its long term history of behavior. As instantaneous
trust value of node j as calculated by node its neighbor i is calculated on time t as wji (t).
The cumulative moving average is the average trust at t for all of the interactions up to
that point using the previous cumulative average. Hence at any time t, a node’s long term
mavg
average trust, wji
(t) is updated as

mavg
wji
(t) =

mavg
(t − 1)wji
(t − 1) + wji (t)
t

The cumulative moving average is essential to characterize long term behavior or strategies
of a node because it does not cause loss of information over time unlike exponential weighted
moving average. The reputation of node j used to decide whether node j is malicious or not,
mavg
is average of all wji
(t) pairs for each neighbor i who receives node j’s spectrum data.

6.2

An asymmetric trust update scheme for On-Off Attacks: Special Case

Till now we have discussed attackers who may either be resource constrained or might have a
particular magnitude of attack (probabilistic or not). In such attacks, there is no preference
on what time slots attacks will be launched. In such cases, trust values over time can be
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updated as equally weighted moving average, that would reflect the true behavior over time.
However, in on-off attacks, nodes have preferences over time periods where a node may choose
not to attack for some time and then attack for some time with a random magnitude. In
such a case, both equally weighted moving average or exponentially weighted moving average
would not reflect true behavior of the node. An equally weighted moving average will lag
in reflecting such attacks, while weighted moving averages will enable a malicious node to
quickly recover or redeem its reputation. In such cases, the trust management framework
should be such that a node with a history of malicious or anomalous behavior should not be
allowed to recover its trust value quickly even though it starts behaving well after a short
burst of attack. In Fig. 6.4, we show an example of reputation of node 20 as seen by node 29.
Malicious node 20 employs an on-off attack where it divides the time domain of 500 slots in
five stages; ‘Stage 1’ ranging from t = 0 − 100, ‘Stage 2’ ranging from t = 101 − 150, ‘Stage 3’
ranging from t = 151−250, ‘Stage 4’ ranging from t = 251−300 and finally ‘Stage 5’ ranging
from t = 301 − 500. In the ‘Stage 1’ of 100 slots, malicious node 20 does not attack in a bid
to gain a high trust value initially. In Stage 2, it attacks for the next 50 time slots with a
random magnitude on each of the time slots. In Stage 3, it does not attack on any of the 100
slots. In Stage 4, it again attacks on 50 slots with a random attack magnitude. In Stage 5, it
again behaves cooperatively. Imagine a node isolation algorithm that checks for node trust
values every 50 slots. Say there is a system which uses a threshold of zero below which nodes
should be identified as malicious. On 100-th, 200-th, 250-th, 350-th, 400-th, 450-th and 500th slot, the node is deemed not malicious by both trust update schemes although we know
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the node is employing a stealthy on-off attack. We see that equally weighted or cumulative
average reacts too slow and fails to reflect malicious nature even at the end of the Stage 2.
On the other hand, exponential weighted moving average although detects attacks quickly
also allow such nodes to quickly recover their reputation on 151-th and 301-th slot. Hence
there is need for a special trust update scheme that would restrict the average reputation to
improve quickly even when a node starts behaving cooperatively after a period of malicious
activity. At the same time it should also be responsive enough to quickly decrease reputation
when a node after building high reputation starts acting maliciously.
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Figure 6.4: Problems of weighted moving averages under on-off attacks

We propose a technique to deal with on-off attacks from a socially inspired concept
that bad actions are far more remembered than our good actions. This forms the basis of our
asymmetric weighted moving average scheme, where slots with instantaneous trust values
wji (t) lower than a threshold Γon−of f are given more weight than time slots where wji (t)
has higher values. The value of Γon−of f is dictated by a system specific risk attitude and
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defines what can termed as sufficiently good behavior. In the update of trust values, there
are two important things; the cumulative average and current trust value. We introduce
four weighting factors χa , χbmax , χcmin and χd such that 0 < χa < 1 ; 0 << χbmax < 1;
0 < χcmin << 1 and 0 < χd < 1. Note the fact that χcmin is much much less than χbmax
introduces an asymmetry. Now there may be four possible scenarios at time t with regard
to On-Off attacks.
mavg
Case(a): wji
(t − 1) > Γon−of f and wji (t) > Γon−of f
mavg
Case(b): wji
(t − 1) > Γon−of f and wji (t) ≤ Γon−of f
mavg
(t − 1) ≤ Γon−of f and wji (t) > Γon−of f
Case(c): wji
mavg
Case(d): wji
(t − 1) ≤ Γon−of f and wji (t) ≤ Γon−of f

In Case (a), a cumulative average higher than Γon−of f suggests a node is maintaining
a sufficiently good behavior. If the current trust value is also higher than Γon−of f then it
suggests continuity of the good behavior. Hence continuing good behavior is rewarded with
mavg
a high weighting factor χa to wji (t) and low weightage given to wji
(t − 1) using 1 − χa .

We name χa as a rewarding factor such that 1 > χa > 0. It helps a historically good node
to improve or atleast maintain its reputation if it also has behaved in a cooperative manner
in this time slot t. Hence for Case (a) cumulative trust is updated as:

mavg
mavg
wji
(t) = (1 − χa ) × wji
(t − 1) + χa × wji (t)
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In Case (b), a cumulative average higher than Γon−of f and wji (t) ≤ Γon−of f suggests
a node maintaining a sufficiently good behavior upto time t − 1 and then initiated some
anomalous behavior. Hence all the good behavior until now needs to be forgotten and
very high weight be given to current slot’s anomalous behavior. This will cause the node’s
cumulative trust value to quickly decrease. Once this happens Case(c) would ensure that
the cumulative trust is not able to redeem itself quickly. Hence wji (t) is weighted with a
mavg(t−1)

high value χbmax such that 1 > χbmax >> 0 and wji

is weighted using 1 − χbmax . We

name χbmax as punishment factor. The higher the value of punishment factor the quicker
and more severe the system will be to new evidence of malicious behavior. In such a case
cumulative trust is updated as:

mavg
mavg
wji
(t) = (1 − χbmax ) × wji
(t − 1) + χbmax × wji (t)

In Case(c), a cumulative average lower than Γon−of f but a current trust value wji (t)
higher than Γon−of f signifies a node whose current behavior is cooperative but has a history
of anomalous behavior which may be as recent as t − 1. Hence even though wji (t) may be
high we assign it a very low weight χcmin such that 0 < χcmin << 1 and assign 1 − χcmin
mavg(t−1)

to wji

. We name χcmin as the redemption factor that controls how fast or slow a

node with malicious history can redeem its trustworthiness if it shows good behavior for a
sufficiently long time. Redemption factors also make it possible for nodes who experienced
noise redeem their trust values. A low redemption factor ensures that trust value is not
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increased quickly even though a node starts to behave honestly after a period of malicious
behavior. In this case cumulative trust is updated as:

mavg
mavg
wji
(t) = (1 − χcmin ) × wji
(t − 1) + χcmin × wji (t)

In Case(d), both cumulative average and current trust value of node j are below
Γon−of f indicating continuing anomalous behavior. In such a case, we provide χd known as
retrogression factor as weight to the current value and 1 − χd weight to cumulative average
such that trust is updated as:

mavg
mavg
wji
(t) = (1 − χd ) × wji
(t − 1) + χd × wji (t)

.
The above scheme termed as asymmetric weighted moving average is effective in
defending against On-Off attacks which is not possible using equally weighted or exponential
weighted moving averages. In simulation section, we also show that this can also be effective
to distinguish malicious nodes and nodes experiencing intermittent noise. In simulation
section we show the performance with various values of χcmin , χbmax , χa and χd .
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6.3

Trust based Robust Information Fusion: Isolation Approach

In this section, we show how trust values can be used to filter out anomalous reports from
being considered while a node fuses reports to obtain the global spectrum occupancy inference. We propose an optimistic Trust based fusion and conservative trust based fusion for
different systems to filter out anomalous reports on each of the time slots. This enhances
the robustness of the fused spectrum occupancy information at nodes.

6.3.1

Optimistic trust based fusion: Beta distribution model

Though steady state values of trust is ideal for node identification and classification, such
values on the other hand do not necessarily contribute towards robust fusion under adversarial conditions. In dynamic systems, waiting for convergence for filtering out spurious reports
is not an option. This is relevant in an ad-hoc CR network in three ways. First, nodes
may be mobile, hence neither the neighbors of a node nor nodes themselves are long lasting
entities. At the same time however, a decision on the channel occupancy needs to be made
from the reports of current neighbors. Hence maintaining history of updates of trust value
of neighbors may not be a prudent idea in a distributed CR network. Second, we seek to
investigate whether performance of the system can be improved while being in a transient
state before convergence of trust value is attained. Third, the attack measure Pattack is a
long term average value, but a particular realization of Pattack at a particular time, may be
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different from the mean value of Pattack . For. e.g., a malicious node has Pattack = 0.60, but
at a particular time slot only 0.3 fraction of channel may have been attacked. Thus, it has
contributed on 70% of the channels on that time slot. In such a case, if we isolate this report
based on long term reputation based exclusion, we will lose the majority of honest opinions
alongwith the minority falsified opinions. However, instantaneous or transient trust or reputation is an index of behavior on the current interaction. Since only current interactions
are important as far as utility of spectrum sensing usage reports are concerned, steady state
trust values should not be used as a metric for robust fusion based on exclusion of spectrum
sensing reports on each time slot.
Using the computed instantaneous trust coefficients, we study the performance of two
fusion schemes: blind fusion and trust-based filtered fusion.

6.3.1.1

Blind fusion

Blind fusion is fusion when no defense mechanism is employed and will be used for comparison
purpose. A node considers all reports it receives from its neighbors. For blind fusion, any
j
node i considers all its neighbors to be honest and includes Badv
from all its neighbors along
j
i
i
i
⊕ Bact
], j ∈ Ni
with its own Bact
. We formally define Blind Fusion as BFblind
= ∇[Badv

where ∇ is the operator for majority voting rule. Majority voting is a popular fusion rule
where final fused inference on a channel is based on what at least half the neighboring nodes
advertise with all the nodes treated equally. ⊕ is the operator for combination.
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6.3.1.2

Optimistic trust-based fusion: Beta expectation model

We propose a fusion scheme whereby we only consider neighboring nodes whose Etj,i is
higher than some trust threshold, Γopt . (Later in Chapter 8, we show how to find the
optimal threshold). Thus, for trust-based fusion, node i only considers those neighbors
whose Etj,i ≥ Γopt . In effect, the fusion is done with information from trusted nodes only.

If Etj,i




 ≥ Γopt


 < Γopt

Node j’s report is Trusted

(6.1)

Node j’s report not trusted

i
We define optimistic Trust based fusion result as; T BF i = ∇[T F Si ⊕ Bact
], where T F Si

is the trusted fusion set of binary vectors accumulated by node i using Eqn.( 6.1), which
j
includes Badv
of trusted nodes only.

Although the nodes are not aware of the ideal scenario, we are aware of what would have
j
j
been the ideal fusion result, which is the case when for all node j ∈ Ni , Bact
= Badv
, so
j
j
i
we define Ideal fusion result for node i as BFideal
= ∇[Bact
⊕ Bact
]. This is later used for

comparing the performance of fusion by measuring deviation from the ideal result.

6.3.1.3

Conservative trust based fusion: Conservative trust model

Similar to the above scheme, we propose a fusion scheme with a conservative threshold Γcopt ,
for the conservative system. (Later in Chapter 8, we show how to find the optimal threshold).
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Thus, for trust-based fusion, node i only considers those neighbors whose wtj,i ≥ Γcopt . In
effect, the fusion is done with information from trusted nodes only.

If wtj,i




 ≥ Γcopt


 < Γcopt

Node j’s report is Trusted

(6.2)

Node j’s report not trusted

i
We define Conservative Trust based Fusion result as CT BF i = ∇[CT F Si ⊕ Bact
],

where CT F Si is the conservative trusted fusion set of binary vectors accumulated by node
j
i using Eqn.( 6.2), which includes Badv
of trusted nodes only.

6.4

Inversion based fusion schemas: An inclusive approach

We introduce a new approach that utilizes the observed invert sequence discussed in the
anomaly monitoring phase in Section 4.4. Using invert sequence IS j,i of a particular neighbor
node, we propose a framework whereby instead of disregarding falsified information from
potential malicious nodes, we utilize the false information to our advantage. We calculate
the trust of each node in the same way as discussed in the optimistic beta expectation
model. Once the trust values are known, we use a log-weighted metric to distinguish the
malicious nodes from others. Then, we use weighted threshold based Selective Inversion (SI)
fusion and Complete Inversion (CI) fusion schemes to effectively fuse data obtained from all
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nodes. We also propose a combination of the two inversion schemes which provides better
performance for all probabilities of attack. We find the conditions for which the combination
works better. The fraction of mismatches (false alarms and missed detections), in presence
of malicious nodes for different probabilities of attack and node densities are considered as a
performance metric. We are able to show that fraction of mismatches for the proposed fusion
techniques is always less than the optimistic trust based fusion which disregards malicious
nodes in fusion. At the end, we demonstrate that we could utilize false information sent by
malicious nodes to increase the gain in cooperative spectrum sensing. Our objective is to
intelligently invert elements of the occupancy vector that are sent my malicious nodes.

6.4.1

A log-weighted metric based on trust

First, we need to figure out how much weight do we give to each node. Note, due to the
variability in the trust values, we cannot treat all nodes equally. If trust of node j as
j,i
computed by node i is Ebeta
, we denote its corresponding weight as:

Wij = loge

j,i
 Ebeta
j,i ]
1 − Ebeta

(6.3)

Although we expect trustworthy nodes to have higher trusts, it is not possible to
have a clear separation between honest and malicious nodes if use trust metrics which are
between 0 and 1, as the range is too small. Hence we use the above equation to clearly
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distinguish between two classes of nodes. The above equation ensures negative weights for
nodes whose trusts values are below 0.5 and positive otherwise as shown in Fig. 6.5. This
ensures that the weights are monotonically increasing for honest nodes and monotonically
decreasing for malicious nodes. With this equation a small decrease in trust for a small
increase in malicious behavior will ensure a large decrease in weight of that node. Then we
use weights to decide the criterion for inversion.
5

Weight

Log weight Value

0

−5
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
Trust

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Figure 6.5: Relation between Beta trust and log weighted metric

6.4.2

Criterion for inversion based fusion

We define two thresholds: minimum (Wmin ) and optimal (Wopt ). Nodes for which the weights
are more than Wopt are considered honest and no change is made to their advertised vectors.
Nodes for which the weights are less than Wmin are deemed totally malicious; thus every
element in their advertised vectors is inverted. However, the elements in the advertised
vectors are selectively inverted (bits flipped) for the nodes whose weights lie between Wmin
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and Wopt using the invert sequence. That is,




> Wopt
No Inversion




If Wij
≤ Wmin
Complete Inversion






 ≤ Wopt and ≥ Wmin Selective Inversion

(6.4)

The challenge lies in determination of these thresholds– which will be determined through
simulations. We symbolically represent inversion based fusion IBF , which is a combination
of Complete Inversion (CI) and Selective Inversion (SI).

6.4.2.1

Complete Inversion (CI)

For all malicious neighbors of i (identified by Eqn. (6.1)), we invert all elements of the advertised vector. In this case, the expected number of channels on which we get the correct
opinion is proportional to Pattack . For example, if a malicious node modifies 80% of the observed data, we get back the actual sensed opinion on 80% of the channels after inversion. Of
course, the hind side of complete inversion is that the correct information becomes incorrect.
Thus it works better for higher Pattack values. Hence it is used when weights are very low
(i.e., lower than Wmin ). We prove this claim in the simulation section.
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6.4.2.2

Selective Inversion (SI)

For all neighbors i, we get the invert sequence ISij from the Eqn. (4.10). ISij indicates all
channels with mismatches. For neighbors whose weights lie between Wopt and Wmin , we seek
j
to selectively invert the advertised values in Badv
for channels comprising the set ISij . Such

inversion forms a new vector for all non-trusted neighbors. This scheme is applicable for
lower Pattack .

The reason for using a combination of two inversion based fusion schemes is because
the network does not know Pattack . However, the trust weights depend on Pattack and as trust
changes, the type of inversion scheme that works better is employed. In simulation section,
how this is implemented.

6.5

Performance analysis measures

In this section, we provide the performance analysis measures which are used to decide
whether proposed malicious node identification and robust fusion models work properly to
provide operational assurance. For the malicious node identification, we use the percentage
of true negative detection as a performance measure. The higher the percentage the better
is the performance. For the performance analysis of robust fusion we use percentage of
mismatches from ideal fusion result. Although the nodes are not aware of the ideal scenario,
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we are aware of what would have been the ideal fusion result, which is the case when for
j
j
j
j
i
all node j ∈ Ni , Bact
= Badv
. So, we define BFideal
= ∇[Bact
⊕ Bact
]. This ideal fusion

result is used for comparing the performance of proposed fusion techniques by measuring
the deviation (fraction or percentage of mismatches) of the concerned fusion technique from
the ideal result. The lesser this deviation, the better is the performance of the scheme. We
use percentage of mismatches from the ideal result as a performance metric, to compare the
degrees of improvement in cooperation sensing result. We also compare proposed schemes
j
i
i
with a scenario where there is no defense mechanism known as BFblind
= ∇[Badv
⊕Bact
] which

models a situation of coexistence with malicious nodes without any defensive scheme. We
show heavy improvement of the proposed schemes compared to blind fusion in the simulation.
In addition to that we show that the inclusive approach of inversion based fusion scheme
works better than the exclusionary trust based fusion which disregards fusion reports.

6.6

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed a reliable malicious node detection technique using machine
learning approach. We proposed a technique that utilizes misleading information sent by
malicious nodes for the purpose of cooperative sensing in cognitive radio networks. Contrary
to common approaches, where information sent by malicious nodes are simply excluded for
any decision making, we follow inclusive approaches to exploit even the misleading information. We argue that if the trustworthiness of each malicious node can be computed, then we
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can appropriately negate the false information. To this end, we use a log-weighted function
to compute the trust value of every node. We present two schemes (selective inversion and
complete inversion) for inverting the occupancy information of the channels. The combination of these two inversion schemes is used which yields better spectrum occupancy estimates
than trust-based and blind fusion schemes for all probabilities of attack. We also find the
conditions for which one scheme works better than the other.
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CHAPTER 7: BAYESIAN INFERENCE BASED CHANNEL
PREFERENCE UNDER COLLABORATIVE SELFISH SSDF
ATTACKS

The previous chapters have discussed SSDF attacks that are not coordinated and the rationale of dishonest nodes was assumed to be only malicious. However, SSDF attacks are more
severe when a collaborative SSDF attack is launched by a coalition of selfish nodes on select
channels. Nodes with a selfish rationale usually have some preferred channels that they seek
to obtain; hence they falsify only on those channels. In such cases, magnitude of attack is
much low compared to malicious SSDF attacks. Meanwhile, defense against such collaborative attacks is difficult with popularly used voting based inference models as acknowledged
in [21, 36, 49]. This chapter introduces a channel centric approach based on Bayesian inference that indicates how much the collective decision on a channel can be trusted. Using
our anomaly monitoring technique, we check if the reports sent by a node match with the
expected occupancy and classify the outcomes into three categories: i) if there is a match, ii)
if there is a mismatch, and iii) if it cannot be decided. Based on the measured observations
over time from a channel centric approach, we estimate the parameters of the hypothesis
of match and mismatch events using a multinomial Bayesian based inference. We quantitatively define the trust as the difference between the posterior beliefs associated with matches
and that of mismatches. The posterior beliefs are updated based on a weighted average of
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the prior information on the belief itself and the recently observed data. We also show, how
can we distinguish between selfish and malicious nodes. We conduct simulation experiments
that show that the proposed trust model is able to distinguish the attacked channels from the
non-attacked ones. Also, a node is able to rank the channels based on how trustworthy the
inference on a channel is. We are also able to show that attacked channels have significantly
lower trust values than channels that are not.

7.1

Motivation of a Channel Centric Bayesian Trust Framework

To counter SSDF attacks, the common approach has been on the identification or isolation
of dishonest nodes [8, 36]. But, there has not been much effort on distinguishing between
selfish and malicious rationale of rogue nodes, or the effect of a coalition formation. While
a malicious attacker’s only objective is maximum damage to other nodes in a network,
selfish attacks are launched by rational nodes on a few strategic channels so as to gain some
tangible benefit. A classic example of a collaborative selfish SSDF attack is a group of nodes
belonging to a certain network provider which wants access to some selected channel(s);
hence all nodes belonging to that provider send false information for those channels while
truthfully reporting on all other channels in order to remain undetected. Compared to the
number of malicious nodes, the number of selfish nodes can be high, considering every node
has a natural proclivity to maximize its benefits. Hence selfish attacks are more plausible
form of a vulnerability. But total isolation of all such selfish nodes is perhaps not the right
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approach. This is because in such a case the fusion process loses the correct information
that the selfish nodes might share [9]. This loss is even more pronounced when the selfish
nodes collaboratively falsify (on same channel sets) with a low probability and tell the truth
more often [7]. In fact, it is often difficult to detect such selfish behavior of nodes through
node centric malicious detection techniques. Thus, instead of isolating and not considering
the selfish nodes at all, we ought to consider shared information on specific channels and
discount or completely ignore information on other channels. Thus, we argue for the need
of a channel-centric defense instead of a node-centric defense.

7.2

System Model for Selfish SSDF Attacks

We consider a distributed secondary cognitive radio network with honest nodes denoted by
H and a set of selfish nodes denoted by S. We consider node i, running our proposed scheme.
We consider N as the number of neighbors of node i, at any point of time. Each node i fuses
the spectrum sensing data it receives from its set of neighboring nodes, denoted by N i . For
any channel k, there are Nki advertised opinions on the occupancy of channel k at node i and
K is the total number of channels being monitored. We use the same model for spectrum
sensing and reporting as was discussed in Section 4.1. The only difference is S denote set
of selfish nodes, K denote total number of channels, and Nk denote the total number of
opinions received on any channel k. We consider that the selfish nodes do not report their
occupancy vectors truthfully; rather they inject errors in their occupancy vectors by flipping
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the bits in the vector collaboratively. The selfish nodes collaborate to attack (i.e., flip) the
same set of channels to mislead the voting based fusion technique. We denote Iattack , as the
fraction of channels that a selfish node flips/changes from its observed vector. Unlike the
attacks from malicious nodes, selfish nodes attack on fewer but some specific channels (based
on certain statistical or other criteria).

7.3

Gathering Channel Centric Evidence

For evidence collection, we use the same technique as we discussed in Section 4.2.1, where
bounds on the predicted power levels for each neighbor is calculated on any channel k using
the anomaly monitoring technique described by Fig. 7.1. But the evidence collection in
the prior section was node centric, where we had an evidence vector for each neighbor. In
contrast, now we collect the same evidence vector but for each channel k, the total number
of channels being K.
Consider Fig. 7.1. Let O be the position of any node i. Let j be its neighbor
whose exact location is not known, but the mutual distance can be estimated through RSS
localization. Through RSS localization, whenever node j sends an advertisement, we can
estimate the mutual distance sij and the hence the locus of neighbor j is anywhere on the
circle centered around node i with a radius sij when transmit powers are same for all nodes.
(See Fig. 4.1) Using commonly used propagation model for RSS [43], we know RSS at node
i on channel k due to primary tower Tk is:
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γki = Pk ×

A2
;
sωi,k

(7.1)

where A is a constant, ω is path loss factor, si,k is the distance between Tk and node i, and
Pk is the transmit power of Tk . On any channel k, the highest and lowest bounds on the
received power for neighbor j due to the primary transmitter Tk transmitting on channel k
is given by: [γkj ]high and [γkj ]low . It has been shown in Section 4.2.1, that the upper and lower
bounds are:
[γkj ]high = Pk ×

A2
sωjmin ,k

(7.2)

Thus the predicted power vector for node j on channel k as calculated by i is given
as:
j
Ppredict
=




j
j
([γ1j ]low , [γ1j ]high ), · · · , ([γkj ]low , [γkj ]high ), · · · , ([γK
]low , [γK
]high ) .

The inference drawn by node i for node j on channel k is given as

djk |inf er





0 if both [γkj ]low and [γkj ]high ≤ γth




=
1 if both [γkj ]low and [γkj ]high ≥ γth






 X otherwise

(7.3)

where X denotes that no inference could be drawn, and γth is the common threshold used
by all nodes to decide if a channel is occupied or not.
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Figure 7.1: Bounds of RSS on channel k of neighbor node j
7.3.1

Formation of trust evidence

The predicted occupancy vector, given the mutual distance between node i and j, is given
as
Dij = [dj1 |inf er , ......, djK |inf er ];

djk |inf er ∈ {0, 1, X}

(7.4)

j
We compare Dij from Eqn. (7.4) with received Badv
= [dj1 , .., djk ..djK ]. At any node i,

we record the results of comparison in a vector Trust Evidence Qjk , where a match (denoted
as α), a mismatch (denoted by β), and channels with value X in Dij are recorded as µ based
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on Eqn. (7.5). If Qjk is the result of the comparison, then




α if djk |inf er = djk




j
Qk =
β if djk |inf er 6= djk






 µ otherwise

(7.5)

From Eqn. (7.5), for each channel k and for each neighbor j, we have one of the three
categories of outcomes: match, mismatch, undecided. We arrange the Qjk for all neighbors
and look for total number of occurrences for each category with respect to channel k. The
number of matches, mismatches and undecided observed for channel k are given by nαk , nβk ,
and nµk respectively. Also, nαk + nβk + nµk = Nk equals the total number of opinions from
N neighbors on channel k. Note this is equally valid for all nodes and therefore we drop the
index i for the node concerned.

7.4

Bayesian Framework for Trust based Channel Preference

From the previous section, we get N independently monitored observations on channel k,
comprising one of the three possible outcomes per observation. We seek to obtain the
Bayesian belief (also called subjective probability) of occurrence of each possible outcome
known as Bayesian belief parameters based on prior observations gathered from the observed
trust evidence. With more observations, we update the Bayesian belief parameter for the hy-
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pothesis increasing the accuracy of the parameters. Since a match indicates a non-anomalous
behavior, a channel with higher posterior belief for match is considered more trustworthy.
To model how node i can compute the belief on channel k, we use the observation
counts to calculate the Bayesian estimate of each of the parameters. Since the following
analysis is valid for any channel k, we drop the suffix k for simplicity. Let X(θ̄) denote the
hypothesis described by the underlying unknown Bayesian probability parameter of a random
trial yielding match, mismatch or undecided as θ̄ = {θα , θβ , θµ }. Here, θα , θβ , and θµ are the
unknown probability of X(θ̄) exhibiting a match, mismatch or undecided respectively. Since
these observation outcomes are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, θα + θβ + θµ = 1. Let
Dα , Dβ , Dµ denote the random variables that represent the number of times, the outcomes
α, β and µ occur. The observation data can be represented as random observation vector
D(N ) = {Dα , Dβ , Dµ } having a multinomial distribution with 3 tuple parameter described
by θα , θβ , and θµ .
Our objective is to estimate and update the probability parameters in X(θ̄) based on
observation evidence D(N ) and prior information on the hypothesis parameter θ̄, itself. In
pursuit, we these we propose the following theorem in Section 7.4.1.
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7.4.1

Bayesian Inference based Decision Reliability

Since there is no information about θ̄ initially, we consider it to be uniformly distributed
a-priori. Subsequent observations dictate how these parameters are updated. Our first step
is to calculate the Bayesian estimate of θ̄.
First, we show the case of estimating belief that a match occurs (θα ). Since in Bayesian
inference, the assumption is that prior and posterior probability have the same distribution,
we can formally define the probability parameters as:

P (X(θ̄) = α|θ̄) = θα
(7.6)

P (X(θ̄) = β|θ̄) = θβ
P (X(θ̄)) = µ|θ̄) = θµ

This assumption is due to the fact that a Dirichlet distribution acts as a conjugate prior to
multinomial distributions. Hence prior and posterior preserve the same form [50].
The observations data D(N ) can be treated as a multinomial distribution with probability parameter θα ,θβ , and θµ, where the probability mass function is given by:

P (Dα = nα , Dβ = nβ , Dµ = nµ |θ̄) = P (D(N )|θ̄) =
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N!
n
θαnα θβ β θµnµ
nα !nβ !nµ !

Given this we can use Bayes theorem to calculate the posterior belief estimate on the
event of a match X̂(θ̄) = α, given observation data D(N ) as:

P (X̂(θ̄) = α|D(N )) =

P (X(θ̄) = α, D(N ))
P (D(N ))

(7.7)

Denominator of the above equation is the marginal probability that can be conditioned or
marginalized on all possible outcomes for θ̄ and since probabilities are continuous

Z
P (D(N )) = P (D(N )|θ̄)f (θ̄)d(θ̄)

(7.8)

D(N )(θ̄)

Since there is no prior information on θ̄ (before any observations) in Eqn. (7.8), we
can assume it to be uniformly distributed such that f (θ̄) = 1 and we can put Eqn. (7.7) in
Eqn. (7.8), and get

N!
P (D(N )) =
nα !nβ !nµ !

Z

n

θαnα θβ β θµnµ dθα dθβ dθµ

(7.9)

D(N )(θα ,θβ ,θµ )

For simplicity, let

R

n

n

θαnα θβ β θµ µ dθα dθβ dθµ = I1

D(N )(θα ,θβ ,θµ )

To solve for I1 we use the multivariate generalization of the Eulerian integral of first kind.
Note that D(N )(θα , θβ , θµ ) denotes a space and we know that a space of m(= 3) parameters
has only m − 1(= 2) degrees of freedom due to the additivity constraint θα + θβ + θµ = 1.
Therefore when we integrate over this space, the integration has m − 1 = 2 dimensions.
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Hence
Z 1Z 1−θα −θβ
(n +1)−1
θα(nα +1)−1 θβ β
(1 − θα − θβ )(nµ +1)−1 dθα dθβ
I1 =
0

(7.10)

0

Eqn. (7.10) is a known form for the multivariate extension of the Beta function which
in this case is defined as B(nα + 1, nβ + 1, nµ + 1). The proof can be found in Lemma 2.4.1
of [51]. In general B(α1 , · · · , αm )

=

Z

xα1 1 −1 ...(1 −

D(x1 ,··· ,xm−1 )
Qm
i=1 Γ(αi )
P
=
Γ( m
i=1 αi )

m−1
X

xi )αm −1 dx1 ...dxm−1

i=1

=

Γ(α1 ) · · · Γ(αm )
Γ(α1 + · · · + αm )

(7.11)

Using the above result, we can write Eqn. (7.10) as

I1 = B(nα + 1, nβ + 1, nµ + 1)
=

Γ(nα + 1)Γ(nβ + 1)Γ(nβ + 1)
Γ(nα + 1 + nβ + 1 + nµ + 1)

(7.12)

Putting Eqn. (7.12) in Eqn. (7.9) we get:

P (D(N )) =

Γ(nα + 1)Γ(nβ + 1)Γ(nβ + 1)
N!
nα !nβ !nµ ! Γ(nα + 1 + nβ + 1 + nµ + 1)
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(7.13)

Since the parameters in gamma functions nα + 1 etc. are all non zero positive values,
we can use the result Γ(z) = (z − 1)! to calculate Eqn. (7.13) as

P (D(N )) =

N!
(N + 2)!

(7.14)

Assuming conditional independence between the X̂(θ̄), D(N ) and θ̄, we calculate the
numerator of Eqn. (7.7), P (X̂(θ̄) = α, D(N )), as:

=

Z

P (X(θ̄) = α, D(N )|θ̄)f (θ̄).d(θ̄)

D(N )(θ̄)

=

Z

P (X(θ̄) = α|θ̄)P (D(N )|θ̄)d(θ̄)

D(N )(θ̄)

N!
=
nα !nβ !nµ !

Z

n

θα θαnα θβ β θµnµ dθα dθβ dθµ

D(N )(θα ,θβ ,θµ )

N!
=
nα !nβ !nµ !

Z
n
θαnα +1 θβ β θµnµ dθα dθβ dθµ

(7.15)

D(N )(θα ,θβ ,θµ )

The above integral has the same form as Eqns. (7.9), (7.10), and (7.11). Hence the
integral portion of Eqn. (7.15) can be rewritten as

=

Z Z1

0 0

1−θα −θβ
(n +1)−1
θα(nα +2)−1 θβ β
(1

which can be solved using Eqn. (7.11).
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− θα − θβ )(nµ +1)−1 dθα dθβ

Using the above result, Eqn. (7.15) can be simplified as

P (X̂(θ̄) = α, D(N )) =

N !(nα + 1)
(N + 3)!

(7.16)

Thus, Eqn. (7.7), can be solved by dividing Eqn. (7.16) by Eqn. (7.14), which gives

P (X̂(θ̄) = α|D(N )) =

Similarly, P (X̂(θ̄) = β|D(N )) =

nβ +1
N +3

nα + 1
N +3

(7.17)

and P (X̂(θ̄) = µ|D(N )) =

nµ +1
.
N +3

These

equations are the expressions for posterior belief of matches, mismatches, and undecided.
For any channel k, we again use the suffix k, for example nαk . For simplicity of notations,
we rewrite the left hand side of Eqn. (7.17) for channel k as Rαk =
R µk =

nµk +1
Nk +3

nαk +1
;
Nk +3

R βk =

nβk +1
;
Nk +3

and

respectively. Of course, it can be verified that Rαk + Rβk + Rµk = 1 and it

satisfies the Cromwell’s rule.

7.4.2

Trust updates

A node observes channels over several time slots. Let at any time t the number of matches,
mismatches, and undecided for channel k are nαk (t), nβk (t) and nµk (t) respectively. The total number of neighbors advertising on channel k at time t is Nk (t). The time window after
which a trust update is made may vary depending on the user requirement and computational resource availability. The system under question may have selfish nodes that employ
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static attacks, where channels attacked remain the same over time, or a dynamic variation,
where channel sets that are attacked may change with time. If we assume a dynamic variation of collaborative attack, then channel attacked in previous slot may not be attacked
in subsequent slots, and since channel usage is based on the current spectrum scenario, the
weightage to old observations should be minimal. Hence we propose an update model with
high sensitivity to latest observations and low sensitivity to old observations. This not only
addresses dynamic attacks but automatically consider static attacks.
We also recommend that the length of the window for a trust update should be
small, so as to capture frequent changes in the attacked channel sets. However, it may also
be noted that frequent changes in collaborative channel sets increase the cost of attack for
the adversary. Hence it is unlikely that the channel sets attacked will be changed on every
slot.
Let the current time slot be denoted as tn . The updated belief corresponding to
match on a channel k at time tn is

Rαtnk

P
1 + nt=1 λtn −t nαk (t)
P
=
3 + nt=1 λtn −t Nk (t)

(7.18)

where 0 < λ < 1 is a sensitivity factor that determines the extent to which old observations
are weighted. t = 1 denotes the oldest observation and t = n denotes the latest. Smaller
values of λ implies that old observations have less weight and vice-versa. Rβtnk and Rµtnk can
be calculated in similar ways from Eq. (7.18).
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7.4.3

Net trust

To capture the effect of both the updated beliefs for matches as well as mismatches into a
single parameter, we define net trust as the difference between Rαtnk and Rβtnk . More formally,

tn
= Rαtnk − Rβtnk
Rnet
k

(7.19)

tn
Note, the range of Rnet
lies between −1 and 1. We use net trust to rank channels from the
k

best to worst. The greater the posterior belief for mismatch, the lesser is its net trust. This
is consistent with the idea that mismatches indicate dishonest opinions. Hence we expect
channels that were attacked to have significantly lower trust.

7.5

A Generalized Bayesian Multinomial Framework for Cooperative Decision
Reliability

Until, now we have been focusing on proposing trust models from evidence gathered for
a specific network. However, we seek to show that our proposed multivariate Bayesian
trust model can be extended to any cooperative network decision making system where
some feedback or anomaly monitoring system is in place. In that light, we provide the
following discussion that shows how we can seamlessly integrate our earlier model discussed
in Section 7.4, into any generic network system where the problem is to quantify availability
or reliability of a decision making process.
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Reliability of a cooperative decision mechanism is critical for the proper and accurate
functioning of a networked decision system. Usually the individual nodes of a network send
their inputs (votes) or opinions to a centralized or distributed decision maker who fuses
inputs from different nodes according to a fusion rule. However, adversaries may choose to
compromise the inputs from different sets of nodes that comprise the system. Often times,
the monitoring mechanisms fail to accurately detect compromised inputs (due to inherent
imperfection or environmental variations); hence cannot categorize all inputs into polarized
decisions: compromised or not compromised. Oftentimes, reliability of a cooperative decision
in a networked system depends on how well the individual nodes perform and how reliable
they are [52]. To improve reliability of a decision making process in the presence of possible
component failures, redundancy and voting schemes are often used [53]. Usually voting
schemes are associated with a fusion rule (e.g., majority or plurality voting) which dictates
how individual votes are combined to decide the final output.
A malfunction or a security breach due to an adversary might result in a faulty input
(vote) to the central decision making entity. Such inputs may potentially have an adverse
effect on the reliability of the decision process– the extent of which depends on the inputs
in question. A failure monitoring mechanism is supposed to detect such faults and provide
a ‘feedback’ on each component. However, this monitoring mechanism might not have the
ability to identify such faults with certainty due to inherent imperfect temporal and spatial
factors. Hence a binary decision on whether a fault occurred or not is not always possible for
all inputs. With the adversary employing a wide variety of attacks to compromise a dynamic
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set of inputs (i.e., deciding the number of inputs and which ones), and imperfect monitoring
conditions, it becomes difficult for a failure monitoring mechanism to quantify reliability of
a collective decision based on inputs from individual nodes.
In the presence of adversaries the compromised inputs may induce incorrect results
in a cooperative decision making process. The set of inputs attacked usually vary over time.
The damage is evident when some central entity of the system using some fusion rule fuses
the inputs from all nodes– compromised or not. A simple example of a cooperative decision
process could be a voting system where nodes vote to produce a binary outcome. If majority
of the inputs from the nodes are compromised, then the simple majority voting rule may
produce a wrong result [54].
Given this, we investigate the quantification of reliability of a cooperative decision
process based on the inputs from various nodes. We assume, each component provides a
single input, all of which are prone to attacks. The underlying imperfect failure monitoring
mechanism produces varying feedback over time. We consider that the outcome of the
monitoring mechanism can be placed into three categories: those we know have not been
compromised, those we know have been compromised, and those which cannot be inferred
either way. Given these, we compute the reliability of a decision process in making a decision
i.e., how reliable its output is. In this regard, we conceptualize the outcome of monitoring
the input over time as a multinomial hypothesis of a Bayesian inference model with three
parameters. We build a Bayesian inference based reliability model, where we assign a value
to a decision that indicates how reliable the outcome of the decision is. The way reliability
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is computed also depends on how much risk a system can tolerate. For example, a mission
critical system may need to have a more strict reliability model because the associated
risks are too high. Therefore, we propose two ways of computing the reliability– first is an
optimistic one and the second is a conservative one. The optimistic model could be applied
to systems where some tolerance for wrong decisions are allowed. However, for a mission
critical system where there is almost no room for erroneous decisions, the conservative model
could be used. To account for the confidence associated with the reliability computation,
we propose an entropy based uncertainty value to represent how certain or uncertain the
computed reliability is. A lower uncertainty associated with reliability value is an indication
of being more confident about the end decision.

7.5.1

Cooperative decision system model

We consider a time-slotted system comprising N voting nodes each of which provides only
one input (i.e., the vote) on each time slot. The nature of the decision is generic; it could
be as simple as a binary voting or it could be some complex decision metric. A centralized
controller fuses all votes from each component through a fusion scheme (e.g., majority or
plurality voting rule) to arrive at a global decision.
Adversarial model: We assume that all the inputs from each component are exposed
to an adversary whose goal is to disrupt the voting process at the central controller. The
adversary has some predefined attack resources and can choose to attack different sets of
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inputs over time and also attack varying number of inputs in each time slot. However, it
maintains a long term average of the fraction of the inputs it attacks which we call the
probability of attack and denote as Pa . For example, Pa = 0.6 means that the adversary
compromises 60% of the inputs over a large period of time. Hence a single observation (over
one time slot) is not sufficient for characterizing the behavior of the adversary.

Imperfect component failure monitoring: We assume that there is a component failure
monitoring or anomaly detection mechanism in place that infers whether the input from each
component has been compromised or not. Oftentimes, the monitoring mechanism cannot
infer anomaly with certainty. Thus, it classifies the inputs into three categories: i) compromised, ii) not compromised, and iii) undecided. All three are a function of environmental
parameters that may be dynamic over time. Note, the monitoring occurs over a period of
time. Also system transients and noisy environments may increase temporal uncertainty.
Therefore, reliability is computed over time– a larger time window of observation allows a
more accurate estimation of the actual reliability.
Uniformly distributed prior inference: Since there is no bias over any of the three
possible outcomes of the monitoring process, we assume that the initial probabilities of each
is equal.
Probability of detection: We define the probability of detection as the percentage
of ‘nodes’ inputs that can be accurately inferred as compromised or not compromised and
denote it as Pdet . Let us further illustrate the meaning of Pdet using Fig. 7.2 that shows an
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input in reality could be either compromised or not compromised. If compromised, it can be
inferred as either as compromised with a probability (say a1 ) or undecided with probability
1 − a1 . Note, we assume that there is no way a compromised input will be inferred as not
compromised. This assumption is because we argue that ‘undecided’ is inferred in absence of
credible evidence else there will be a compromised feedback only when sure. Similarly, if an
input is not compromised, it can be inferred as either ‘not compromised’ with a probability
(say b1 ) or ‘undecided’ with probability 1 − b1 . Again, there is no way a not compromised
component will be inferred as compromised. Thus, for the two real cases, detection occurs
with probabilities a1 and b1 . If an input has equal chances of being compromised and
not compromised, then Pdet =

a1 +b1
.
2

Else, a1 and b1 will have to be weighted with their

corresponding probabilities. For all practical purposes, we consider Pdet to be at least 0.5.

Real

Inferred
a1

Compromised
Input

Compromised

1 − a1
1 − b1

Undecided

Not compromised

b1
Not compromised

Figure 7.2: Inference possibilities for detection probability
The above features make the problem of computing the reliability of the output
decision a probabilistic concept. Hence, we compute the reliability as a continuous process
based on observations over time slots. If the adversary uses the same attack strategy, then
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the reliability will converge sooner. On the other hand, if the adversary changes its attack
strategy (i.e., dynamic attack strategy), the reliability will oscillate even for large time
windows.

7.5.2

Reliability based decision making

Suppose that the three feedbacks of the monitoring mechanism– ‘not compromised’, ‘compromised’, or ‘undecided’ be denoted by α, β and µ respectively. Let nα represent the number
of inputs that have ‘not’ been compromised, nβ represent the number of inputs observed to
have been compromised, and nµ is the number of inputs for which we do not know either
way. Of course, nα + nβ + nµ = N . Since the values of nα , nβ and nµ change over time, we
represent these observations at time t as nα (t), nβ (t) and nµ (t).
Since the system’s underlying parameters of cooperative voting behavior are unknown,
we propose to use Bayesian inference to update corresponding probability estimate for a
hypothesis that the decision process is correct with a certain reliability. The system is
only as reliable as the individual inputs are. Therefore, we have to calculate the posterior
probabilities associated with encountering each of the three feedbacks. The final decision
reliability will be a function of these posterior probabilities which are also known as belief
estimate in Bayesian inference.
To begin with, an uniform belief over the three possibilities is assumed as there is no
initial information. As time progresses, we update the belief estimate based on the observed
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values of α, β, and µ which increases the accuracy of the estimate of the belief associated
with each category.
We define θα , θβ , and θµ as the probabilities for an input being ‘not compromised,
‘compromised’, and ‘undecided’ respectively. Of course, θα + θβ + θµ = 1, since the outcomes
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. We define X(θ̄) as the hypothesis described by these
underlying unknown Bayesian probability parameters where θ̄ = {θα , θβ , θµ }.
Let Dα , Dβ , and Dµ represent the random variables that represent the number of
times the outcomes α, β and µ occur. The observation data can be represented as random
observation vector D(N ) = {Dα , Dβ , Dµ } having a multinomial distribution also known as
concentration hyperparameter of the underlying 3-tuple probability parameter described by
θα , θβ , and θµ .
As mentioned earlier, there are N independently monitored nodes of a system whose
parameters for voting behavior are unknown due to changing adversarial attack strategies and
the imperfect monitoring mechanism. Given this, we calculate the Bayesian belief associated
with ‘not compromised’. Similarly, we will model Bayesian posterior belief for the other two
cases as well viz. compromised and undecided.
We use the observation counts from the sequential observations over time to calculate
the posterior Bayesian estimate of each of the parameters. Our objective is to estimate and
update the probability parameters in X(θ̄), viz. θα , θβ , and θµ based on observation evidence
D(N ) and prior information on the hypothesis parameter, θ̄, itself.
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Since there is no information about θ̄ initially, we consider the prior parameters of θ̄ to
be uniformly distributed a-priori. Subsequent observations will decide how these parameters
are updated. Our first step is to calculate the Bayesian estimate of θ̄.
First, we show the case of estimating belief that a ‘not compromised’ occurs (θα ).
We can use our prior framework by using Eqn. 7.17. In a similar way, we can calculate
θβ and θµ . These equations are the expressions for posterior belief of ‘not compromised’,
‘compromised’, and ‘undecided’. To simplify the notations of belief estimates of the three
categories, we rewrite them as Rα , Rβ , Rµ respectively. Of course, it can be verified that
Rα + Rβ + Rµ = 1. The above equations also satisfy the Cromwell’s rule [55], which suggests
that no prior belief unless logically impossible, should be assigned zero probability even if
no events in that category has occurred so far.
We mentioned that in Bayesian inference posterior probabilities may be used as priors
for future calculations. The Cromwell’s rule leaves open the probability however small, to
experience an event that has not occurred yet but may happen in future. Hence Bayesian
estimates should have non-zero priors for an event that has not occurred yet. From the
derived equation it is evident that even if nβ = 0, Rβ 6= 0, is a very small number but not
zero when N is large.
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7.5.3

Reliability models

We propose two reliability models and also show how entropy can capture the uncertainty
associated with the reliability calculation due to the undecided inputs.

7.5.3.1

Decision Reliability for an Optimistic System

For a system, we assumed that adversary has uniformly chosen the inputs it chooses to
attack i.e., there is no reason for preferential attack on a certain component’s input. Hence
we can account for the undecided Rµ by splitting it in the ratio of Rα : Rβ , and adding it
to the value Rα to provide the optimistic reliability denoted by Rso . Of course, when the
proportion of Rµ is high, we may not be as confident on the reliability value than when we
have lower values of Rµ . Thus, Rso is computed as:

Rso = Rα +

7.5.3.2

Rα
Rµ
Rα + Rβ

(7.20)

Decision Reliability for a Conservative System

Unlike the optimistic approach, where the undecided ones are split in a ratio, the conservation
model treats the undecided ones as if they were compromised. In other words, only the ‘not
compromised’ event (Rα ) is used for computing the reliability. Hence,
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Rsc = Rα

(7.21)

This conservative way of computing the reliability is more appropriate for missioncritical systems where the decisions can only be made based on the ‘not compromised’
inputs. No risk is taken on the undecided inputs even if there could be some that were not
compromised.

7.5.3.3

Uncertainty associated with Reliability

System reliability as computed by Eqn. (7.20) can yield the same value for different sets of
Rα , Rβ , and Rµ . For example, consider two scenarios.
Scenario 1: Rα = Rβ = 0.5, and Rµ = 0
Scenario 2: Rα = Rβ = 0.3, and Rµ = 0.4
For both scenarios, the optimistic decision reliability as given by Eqn. (7.20) is 0.5 as shown
in Table 7.1. It can be noted that though scenario 2 has higher Rµ than scenario 1, Rso for
both are the same. However, intuitively we ought to trust scenario 1 more than scenario 2
because more certain decisions have been made when Rµ is less. We know that higher values
of Rµ reduces the chances of being closer to the real value of reliability. As shown in the two
scenarios, the optimistic reliability can yield the same value for different sets of Rα , Rβ , and
Rµ
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In order to illustrate the uncertainty associated with the Rµ , we use entropy which
is a measure of uncertainty inherent in a system. Usually, entropy of a system uses the
steady state probabilities that the system could be in. We define the entropy of the decision
reliability as:
Es = −[Rα log2 (Rα ) + Rβ log2 (Rβ ) + Rµ log2 (Rµ )]

(7.22)

The entropy, Es , captures the uncertainty which is shown in Table. 7.1. Scenario 1
with Rµ = 0 has an uncertainty measure of 0.69 which is lower than scenario 2 with 1.08.
Thus, the reliability of scenario 1 can be trusted more than that of scenario 2.
Now, let us consider scenario 3 which has the same Rµ as of scenario 2; however, Rβ
is higher than scenario 2. Hence scenario 3 has lesser reliability value than scenario 2. Since
scenario 2 has been established to be less trustworthy than 1, we can also verify that from
Rso of scenario 3 is also less than that of scenario 1. However, these arguments hold true
only when at least 50% of the observations are accurate observations, i.e., Rµ < 0.5. This
is a reasonable assumption as it is impractical to have a detection mechanism which cannot
detect or decide majority of the time.
The certainty measure can be represented by a value Cs = 1 − Es , through which we
can sort systems in terms of how confident we are about the corresponding reliabilities. The
concept is useful to resolve a tie while choosing more reliable systems. Hence we conclude that
scenario 1 is most reliable choice followed by scenario 2 and then scenario 3. System reliability
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is hence a combination of optimistic reliability value and entropy measures associated with
the evidence.
Table 7.1: Reliability-Entropy tuple; N=1000
Scenario Rα Rβ Rµ Rso
Es
Cs
1
0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.00 0.00
2
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.57 −0.57
3
0.2 0.4 0.4 0.33 1.51 −0.51
4
0.7 0.3 0.0 0.7 0.88 0.12
5
0.10 0.6 0.3 0.14 1.29 −0.29

7.6

Modeling Decision Reliability under Errors: A Special Case

Although in the previous section we argued that a monitoring system decides an outcome
to be undecided, if there is lack of sufficient evidence to point towards a polarized binary
decision. However, some environments may be severely noisy (like wireless systems) where
there may be errors. Hence there is a possibility that actually ‘compromised’ (α) may be
erroneously decided as not compromised (β) and vice versa. The Fig. 7.3, shows such additional possibilities not described by model in Fig. 7.2. We define the modified probability of
detection as the percentage of inputs that can be accurately inferred as compromised or not
compromised and denote it as Pdetect . Let us further illustrate the meaning of Pdetect using
Fig. 7.2 that shows an input in reality could be either compromised or not compromised. If
compromised, it can be inferred as either as ‘compromised’ with a probability a1 (correct)
or ‘’undecided with probability a2 (uncertain) or ‘not compromised’ with a probability a3
(missed detection). Similarly, if an input was not compromised, it can be inferred as ei124

ther ‘not compromised’ with a probability b1 (correct) or ‘undecided’ with probability b2 or
‘compromised with a probability b3 (false alarm). Thus, for the two real cases, detection
occurs with probabilities a1 and b1 . If an input has equal chances of being compromised
and not compromised, then Pdetect =

a1 +b1
.
2

Else, a1 and b1 will have to be weighted with

their corresponding probabilities. For all practical purposes, we consider Pdetect to be at least
0.5, since it is impractical to quantify reliability where majority of feedbacks are incorrect.
Similarly, Puncertain =

a2 +b2
2

denote the probabilities of ignorance (expressing inherent un-

certainty) about inputs. Perror =

a3 +b3
2

denotes probability of errors made by the feedback

system. These probabilities are used for performance evaluation.

Monitored

Real
a1
Compromised

Compromised

a2
b3

Component
Not compromised

Undecided

b2

a3
b1

Not compromised

Figure 7.3: Special Case: Inference possibilities under errors
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CHAPTER 8: SIMULATION MODEL AND RESULTS

In this chapter we represent an exhaustive collection of simulation results for performance
analysis of our proposed optimistic and conservative trust models in terms of identifying
malicious nodes, improving accuracy of cooperative sensing under attacks, analyzing performance of different strategies employed from malicious nodes perspective, and channel centric
bayesian approaches towards quantifying reliability.

8.1

Simulation Set Up

In order to validate the proposed trust models, we conduct extensive simulation experiments.
For optimistic trust model and training data sets, we simulate a CR network with 30 randomly distributed secondary nodes out of which 9 are programmed malicious. The nodes
are scattered over 60x60 area with a sharing radius of 20 units. There are 40 primary transmitters each corresponding to one channel. The operating spectrum length for most results
is 40 channels. For some results we considered denser networks with the same number of
nodes in a smaller area. We choose the other simulation parameters from [56], where the
normalization threshold is kept at -33.7dbm and transmit power of primary is 1000 mW. The
pathloss factors are varied from 3 to 6. For our testing set, for identifying malicious nodes
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we choose a static network of 100 nodes in a 600X600 grid and one third of them are chosen
to be randomly malicious and the sharing radius is kept as 200 units. We subject our model
to different attack strategies, pathloss and radio environments and different attack measures.
For inversion based fusion, we choose a network of 100x100 with 100 nodes keeping other
factors same. Most of the results are for non collaborative SSDF. We will compare our fusion
results with the blind majority voting fusion rule, majority voting based exclusion and KL
divergence based techniques.

8.2

Attack Strategies by Malicious Nodes

First, we compare the two attack measures Pattack and Iattack to investigate how they affect the
cooperative spectrum sensing result in Section 8.2.1. We find the percentage of mismatches
from the ideal fusion result which is used as a performance analysis measure. We report
which out of the two is a better attack measure from malicious user’s perspective; i.e., the
greater the percentage of mismatches, the better would be the attack measure. The reverse
would be true when we analyse results from defender’s perspective.
Second, we seek to find that given an attack measure, how the collaborative or noncollaborative SSDF strategies affects the network using the same performance analysis measure in Section 8.2.2.
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8.2.1

Intensity of attack versus probability of attack: Effects on cooperative
sensing accuracy
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18

Percentage Of Mismatches

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
0.6
Magnitude of Attack

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

Figure 8.1: Percentage of mismatches with blind fusion using Iattack and Pattack

We plot the performance when nodes blindly fuse local spectrum sensing data from
all nodes, (Blind Fusion), for different values (magnitude of attack) under Pattack and Iattack
as shown in Fig. 8.1. The results throw light upon which out of the two is a better attack measure from the malicious user’s perspective and the relationship of percentage of
mismatches (the damage effect) with the magnitude of attack. We observe that Pattack is a
better attack strategy when the magnitude of attack is greater than 0.5. When the values
of the attack measures are less than 0.5, there is little difference on the damages they inflict
in terms of deviation from the actual result. In addition, Pattack does not require any extra effort hence is feasible from the cost perspective. Hence, we conclude employing Pattack
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is more useful for the malicious nodes (given majority voting is used for fusion), and hence
most of the subsequent results assumes the worst case attack measure Pattack unless explicitly
mentioned.

8.2.2

Non-collaborative versus collaborative SSDF: Effects

We plot and compare the performance analysis measure when nodes use blind majority
voting fusion under collaborative and non collaborative attack strategies for different values of
Pattack . The results elucidate which is a better strategy from the malicious user’s perspective
and their relationship with value of Pattack . From Fig. 8.2, we observe that for most values
of Pattack , collaborative SSDF is a better attack strategy in terms of the deviations it inflicts
from the actual result. However, collaborative SSDF becomes less effective than its non
collaborative counterpart when Pattack > 0.8. Hence the conclusion is given Pattack < 0.8,
collaborative SSDF is a better attack strategy. However, it must be noted that cost of
collaboration between malicious nodes is higher than non collaboration and may not always
be feasible. For most of the subsequent results, we assume non collaborative SSDF unless
explicitly mentioned. We keep broader study under collaborative SSDF as future work.
In Fig. 8.2, we compare the damages done by collaborative SSDF attack and non
collaborative SSDF attack. We observe that collaborative attack is able to damage more for
most Pattack , except when Pattack > 0.80. Hence if cost, synchronization and fading issues are
taken care of collaborative attacks will cause more damage for lower magnitudes of Pattack .
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Figure 8.2: Comparison of effects: Collaborative vs non-collaborative SSDF

8.3

Optimistic Trust Model: Trust Measurement

In this section, we show the results of trust computation for the optimistic trust heuristic
and the modified beta trust. We also show relevant differences between steady state and
transient values.
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8.3.1

Optimistic trust heuristic: Transient state

We measure the transient state trust values for the optimistic trust heuristic. Fig. 8.3(a)
depicts the trust distribution when all malicious nodes have a Pattack = 0.4 and there is no
control channel noise. We observe that the honest nodes have very high (= 1) trust value,
and malicious nodes have much lower trust values. In Fig. 8.3(b), we capture the trust values
under a very noisy environment, where bits in Badv are randomly flipped or are lost (with
Pattack = 0.50). From the figures, it is evident that there is a significant difference between
the trust values of honest and malicious nodes although the honest nodes do not have trust
values as high as those in Fig. 8.3(a).
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Figure 8.3: Optimistic Trust Heuristic (a) For Pattack = 0.40 (b) For Pattack = 0.50
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8.3.2

Optimistic trust heuristic: Steady state

Next, we find the steady state and the instantaneous values for a malicious node under the
two attack measures Pattack = 0.50 and Iattack = 0.50. Fig. 8.4 shows the instantaneous trust
and moving average trust of a node over time as seen by one of its neighbor under Iattack .
Fig. 8.5 shows the same but when the node uses Pattack . We see that in the former case, the
convergence of the average trust value reaches quicker (on time slot 40) than in the case of
when Pattack is launched where convergence is reached after 80 time slots. This is because,
Pattack attacks different number of channels as well as on different channels keeping a long
term mean while Iattack attacks on different channels. Hence Iattack in general can be detected
or learned quicker. This is an incentive that may discourage malicious entities to use Iattack .
The variance of instantaneous trust value from the mean is 5 times higher in Pattack than
that of Iattack .

8.3.3

Intensity vs. probability of attack: The better alternative

From Figs. 8.4 and 8.5, we provide a qualitative explanation on which is a better attack
measure if the malicious nodes want to stay undetected for the maximum amount of time.
For Iattack , total number of channels remain same everytime although individual channels
attacked vary. Pattack induces more doubts where the number of channels as well as channels
attack vary. Hence the second strategy is far more difficult for defenders to form a concrete
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opinion quickly. The second attack strategy will have more standard deviation and variance
when it comes to the distribution of instantaneous trust samples.
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Figure 8.4: Optimistic trust heuristic over time under Iattack : Instantaneous and moving
average for a node as seen by neighbor
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Figure 8.5: Optimistic trust heuristic over time under Pattack : Instantaneous and moving
average
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8.3.4

Relation of optimistic trust values and magnitude of attack

Given that there is no noise during transmission of advertised vectors and randomly chosen
channels sets, we conclude that the relation between optimistic trust heuristic and magnitude
j,i
j,i
of attack is an inverse linear relation. In general, Esteady
≈ 1 − Pattack or Esteady
≈ 1 − Iattack .

This is true for an individual malicious node as seen in Fig. 8.6(a), and for the set of all
malicious nodes as seen in Fig. 8.6(b), over different magnitudes of attack. In general, we
conclude that trust value decreases as the attack magnitude grows. Thus we prove that the
more a malicious node attacks the more it damages it’s reputation in the network. This
observation is intuitive as trust is an indication of the level of cooperation a node does to
the network. If it attacks or does not cooperate with a probability of Pattack , then that node
cooperates with a probability of 1 − Pattack . Hence we conclude that the moving average
malicious node’s trust value converge to a value approximately equal to 1 − Pattack for the
optimistic trust model. The advantage of this is that from the trust value we can learn the
magnitude of attack which may have many potential uses. We do not recommend forgetting
factors (except for on-off attack model) as used in many existing trust models, as given our
attack model, use of forgetting or discounting moving averages induce loss of information on
the true level of aggressiveness of a malicious node.
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Figure 8.6: Optimistic Trust over Pattack (a) Individual Node (b) Overall Network

8.3.5

Beta Trust as a subjective probability

In an effort to adhere to Cromwell’s rule, and to depict the subjective probability interpretation of trust, we use Eqn 5.4 to compute the approximated Beta distribution based trust.
The trust values are almost the same as the optimistic trust heuristic with the exception
that honest nodes never have a value exactly equal to 1, but a very close to 1. Likewise,
even if a node changed all the local sensing results, its value will be very close to 0, but not
exactly equal to 0. Fig. 8.7(a), shows the approximated Beta trust based steady state values
for honest and malicious nodes when Pattack = 0.50. Fig. 8.7(b), shows the beta expectation
based trust values at steady state for honest and malicious nodes when Pattack = 0.80. The
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relation between beta expectation based trust value and magnitude of attack is a sub-linear
inverse relation in contrast to linear inverse for optimistic trust heuristic.
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Figure 8.7: Environment with Pathloss=3:(a) Optimistic Trust for Pattack = 0.50 (b) Optimistic Trust for Pattack = 0.80

8.4

Conservative Trust Model: Malicious Node Identification

In this section, we discuss the results of conservative trust model. We look at the distribution
of the conservative trust weights for different pathloss environments and different Pattack
values. This will give idea as to how pathloss and Pattack effect the conservative trust model,
and whether there is significant difference between honest and malicious nodes.
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8.4.1

Computed trust values

Fig. 8.8(a), shows the conservative trust weights in an environment of pathloss factor 5 and
Pattack = 0.8. We see that all the malicious nodes have high negative trust weights while
honest nodes have positive trust weights. Hence the differentiation is evident. Using a
network with 30 nodes with a sharing radius of 20 units scattered on an area 60x60 we show
that the trust values of malicious nodes are correctly reflected even when local malicious
node density (per honest node) is very high. This result is an improvement from voting
based exclusion and joint entropy based exclusion as we show in Section 8.4.3.
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Figure 8.8: Conservative Trust Value: (a) Pathloss=5; Pattack = 0.80 (b) Pathloss=4;
Pattack = 0.50
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Figure. 8.8(b) shows the conservative trust weights in an environment of pathloss
factor 4 and Pattack = 0.5. We see that all the malicious nodes either have very low positive
or very low negative trust weights closer to zero, while honest nodes have positive trust
weights. The difference between the trust values between malicious and honest nodes is
evident, but not as drastic as the previous case when pathloss factor was 5 and Pattack = 0.80.
The first reason for this trend is because an intermediate value of Pattack attacks fewer
channels. Another difference from the preceding result, is that the weights of honest nodes
are comparatively low in this case than the previous scenario. This is because pathloss 4
induces more uncertainty in evidence which is reflected in their lower trust than honest node
values in Fig. 8.8(a).
Figure. 8.9 shows trusts for the preceding example with Pattack = 0.5 but a lower
pathloss factor of 3. Through this, we seek to see the effect the pathloss factor alone,
keeping Pattack same. We see that there is an increase in the weights of honest nodes while
there is not much to choose for the malicious node values. However, if the Pattack = 0.80, the
gap between the trust weights become evident as was depicted in Fig. 8.8(a). The reason
for increased values of honest node’s is due to less uncertainty induced due to lower pathloss
factor 3.
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Figure 8.9: Conservative Trust Value: Pathloss=3; Pattack = 0.50

8.4.2

Worst case performance: An improvement from existing approaches

Fig. 8.10, we show that both the proposed models work well under high densities of malicious
nodes (greater than 60%), and under collaborative SSDF attacks. This is in contrast to
existing approaches that cannot detect when nodes are collaborative and should number
of malicious nodes exceed 50% as we will show in Section. 8.4.3. We simulate a scenario
with 11 honest nodes and 19 malicious nodes, ensuring the high average local densities of
malicious node around each node. We calculate the conservative trust wj for each node in
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Fig. 8.10. From the figure, it is evident that our proposed method works even under a high
malicious node density (63%) with collaborative attacks. Validation of accurate detection
across different densities is shown in Fig. 8.11.
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Figure 8.10: Worst case performance under high density of collaborative malicious nodes
and high Pattack

8.4.3

Comparison of node identification with existing research

We seek to compare the benefits of our proposed trust based malicious node detection scheme
with a few existing research works. We use the more comprehensive and sophisticated conservative trust model and compare with KL divergence and majority voting based exclusion
(decouple) method. We compare the percentage of accurate detection over various fraction
of malicious nodes for different Pattack .
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Figure 8.11: Comparison of Proposed Trust Models with KL distance method

In Fig. 8.11, we observe that under various values of fraction of malicious nodes and
Pattack , our method using wj value much better results than existing researches discussed in
[36, 49] particularly under high fractions of malicious nodes or high Pattack .
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Figure 8.12: Comparison of Proposed Trust Models with majority voting based exclusion

In Fig. 8.12, we compare our work with another recent work [57]. We report significantly high true negative detection percentage across different malicious node fractions.
141

8.4.4

Testing set performance for malicious node identification

We consider a network with 100 nodes over an area of 600x600 where malicious nodes are
initially chosen randomly that remain fixed throughout. The density of malicious nodes are
kept at 0.25. The malicious nodes were equally divided into 3 groups where each group had
different Pattack . The first group had a Pattack = 0.30, the second group had Pattack = 0.50,
and the third group had a Pattack = 0.80. Given this, we apply our conservative threshold
wclassif y to identify malicious nodes for a conservative system with different pathloss factors.
We explore both options namely; different wclassif y based on the relevant environment and
single wclassif y for all kinds of environments. By comparing, Figs. 8.13 and 8.14, we observe
that the first approach gives more consistent results than the second approach for the group
for malicious nodes with lower Pattack of 0.30. For Pattack ≥ 0.50, either approach works well.

8.4.4.1

Testing Set Performance: Identification of malicious nodes with pathloss=4

From Fig. 8.13, we have the testing set for a CR network with pathloss factor 4 and the
corresponding wclassif y = 0.29. We observe that this effectively captures all 27 malicious
nodes in our testing set. This is the result that mimics an ad-hoc CR network in a dense
environment.
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Figure 8.13: Testing set performance for node classification: Pathloss=4; wclassif y = 0.29

8.4.4.2

Example bad performance for low Pattack under single wclassif y

In Fig. 8.14, we seek to investigate whether we can apply wclassif y = 0.29 to CR network
with a different pathloss factor 3.2. We observe that this fails to capture 7 out 27 malicious
nodes. These 7 nodes that are not detected are from the first group of 9 malicious nodes
with low Pattack of 0.30. This is indicative that the approach of using a single wclassif y for
classification is not optimal for minimizing missed detection. If we used a higher threshold,
we would increase false alarms where we classify honest nodes as malicious. Hence we propose
the use of different wclassif y specific to the environment.
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Figure 8.14: Missed detections using single wclassif y : Pathloss factor = 3

8.4.4.3

Testing Set Performance: Identification of malicious nodes with pathloss=3.2

In Fig. 8.15, we have a testing set with pathloss factor 3.2. We use wclassif y = 0.42 corresponding to the results of the SVM output corresponding to training set T1 with pathloss 3
and Pattack = 0.50. We observe that this comfortably captures all of the 27 nodes as malicious. Hence the SVM results from the training set is able to generalize unseen examples for
a different network.
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Figure 8.15: Testing set performance for node classification: Pathloss=3.2; wclassif y = 0.42

8.4.4.4

Testing Set Performance: Identification of malicious nodes with pathloss=4.8

In Fig. 8.16, we have a testing set with pathloss factor 4.8. We use wclassif y = 0.39 corresponding to the results of the SVM output corresponding to training set T3 with pathloss 5
and Pattack = 0.50. We observe that this comfortably captures all of the 27 nodes as malicious. Hence the SVM results from the training set is able to generalize unseen examples for
a different network in this case too.
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Figure 8.16: Testing set performance of node classification: Pathloss=4.8; wclassif y = 0.39

In the above section, we report to have successfully identified malicious nodes under
different pathloss environments and over different realistic values of Pattack .

8.4.5

Defending against on-off attacks: A special case

In On-Off attacks, we limit our study to particular node 20 which launches on-off attacks
in the five stages over 500 slot time window as was discussed in Section. 6.2. We plot the
results of On-Off attacks as seen by one of its neighbor node 29 using equations from the
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asymmetric weighted moving average discussed in Section. 6.2. We compare the results with
other popular trust update schemes and justify suitability of asymmetric averaging with
regard to On-off attacks.

8.4.5.1

Choice of weighing factors and threshold

The weighing factors χa , χbmax , χcmin , and χd are chosen as 0.999, 0.999, 0.001 and 0.001.
We can verify that this satisfies the conditions: 0 < χcmin << χbmax < 1, 0 < χa < 1, and
0 < χd < 1. From the skewed values of the weighing factors χcmin and χbmax , it justifies the
asymmetry that we provide by giving negative behaviors a very high weightage and positive
behavior and very low weightage after the first occurence of negative behavior. The choice of
χa and χd can be used to control the rate of trust redemption. If a system requires slower trust
redemption that lower value of χa and lower value of χd is necessary. We put these weighing
factors in the four case based equations discussed in Chapter 6 in Section. 6.2. Since there
is no particular magnitude of attack we keep the mid point between the trust value range
(−1, +1) as Γon−of f = 0. However, Γon−of f can be adjusted according to the requirements of
the system. More conservative systems will have Γon−of f > 0. Different values of χmin and
χmax can be chosen to ensure more fairness to nodes in a network inherently susceptible to
more bit flips due to noise.
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8.4.5.2

Comparison with Equal Weighted Moving Average

In Fig. 8.17, we show how the proposed asymmetric weighted moving average performs as
opposed to the equal weighted moving average. We observe that at Stage 1 with no attacks,
both schemes preserve a high trust value, but when attacks start from the 101 st time slot for
the next 50 slots, asymmetric weighted moving average ensures cumulative trust is decreased
more rapidly and preserves a low value. Equal weighted moving average is slow to react due
to the node having behaved well in the first 100 slots. This happens because once current
value in a slot is less than zero, the model forgets previous high reputation through a very
low value 1−χbmax = 0.001 and expresses extremely high weight χbmax = 0.999 to the current
values from the 101th time slot, thus causing the cumulative trust at stage 2 to decrease
rapidly. In the beginning of Stage 3, when the attack ceases, we see that trust value reflected
by asymmetric average is low enough (−0.25) to reflect node’s malicious history while equal
weighted moving average fails to capture because the on-off attack ratio is 1 : 2, i.e., more
slots with no attacks. This happens because, previous cumulative trust of less of than zero
at the end of Stage 2 is given a very high weight compared to current honest behavior. It
prevents the trust values to improve even during honest behavior. In Stage 4, when attack
starts after honest behavior for 100 slots, we see the significant difference between the trust
values of the two schemes is preserved. Same is the case in Stage 5, where the reasons of
a very slow increase in trust values under asymmetric average compared to equal weighted
average is the difference in weighing factors assigned to previous and current trust values.
Hence, we conclude that asymmetric weights can offer the benefits not provided by equal
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weighted moving average in terms of reacting quickly to on-off attacks and preserving a low
trust value of a malicious node. Through this scheme we have ensured that even though it
targets only 100 out of 500 slots, the model can identify such nodes.
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Figure 8.17: Asymmetric moving average vs equal weighted moving average: Node 20

8.4.5.3

Comparison with Exponential Weighted Moving Average

The major criticism of exponentially weighted moving average was that although it reacts
quickly when attacks start, it also forgets malicious behavior as quickly as it reacts. This
is inappropriate because a malicious node should not be allowed to increase its trust value
quickly unless it engages in a long period of honest behavior to redeem its trust. The key
point where a difference is created is case(c) of the on-off defense schema where we provide
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very low value to honest behavior after a period of dishonest behavior. Hence it’s cumulative
trust value hardly increases. In Fig. 8.18, we do not see much difference in Stage 1 due to no
attacks. Also there is not much difference is Stage 2 as there more weight given to new trust
values by both models. However, in Stage 3, exponential weighted moving average allows the
malicious node to quickly recover its trust value owing to forgetting old values. On the other
hand, asymmetric average selectively does not forget old values that are low. This happens
because, previous cumulative trust of less of than zero (selected Γon−of f ) at the end of Stage
2 is given a very high weight compared to current honest behavior. It prevents the trust
values to improve even in the period of honest behavior. We see that for all subsequent stages
the exponentially weighted averages oscillates between high and low values, but asymmetric
average preserves a low value all the while at the same time allowing fairness by allowing
very slow increase of cumulative trust at stage 5 owing to its continuous good behavior for
200 slots. This provision also helps nodes which experience noise to eventually redeem their
trust on experiencing good transmission channels as we see next.

8.4.5.4

Distinguishing between On-Off attacks and Random Noise

The asymmetric model also provides some fairness associated for nodes which experience high
temporal noise. This helps to differentiate malicious behavior from wireless channel induced
effects as the node with temporal noise will eventually regain trustworthiness because noise
is inherently bursty than on-off attacks. In Fig. 8.19, we can see results of a node modeled
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Figure 8.18: Asymmetric moving average vs. exponentially weighted moving average: Node
20

as an on-off attacker versus being an honest node experiencing noise. We see our approach
that uses asymmetric average leaves an opportunity to redeem trust values decreased due to
high temporal noise.
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Figure 8.19: Difference of trust distribution due to malicious behavior vs random noise

151

8.4.5.5

Testing Set: Asymmetric average for nodes without on-off attacks

In practical systems, we may not know which node will launch on-off attacks and which
nodes will not. So in this section, we study whether the asymmetric averaging is robust
and generic enough to accurately preserve malicious identification for nodes which launch
a regular Pattack instead of on-off attacks. In Fig. 8.20, we show the difference between
equal weighted moving average and asymmetric moving average for the same node which
launches Pattack = 0.50 instead of on-off attack in a testing set. We see that the correctness
of asymmetric average update is not restricted to only nodes that launch on-off attack but
also regular malicious nodes. Infact, asymmetric average is more conservative than other
methods as it gives a much lower trust value that equal weighted moving average when a
node launches probabilistic attack with 0.5 magnitude as seen in the figure below.
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Figure 8.20: Asymmetric average for nodes without On-Off attacks:Pattack = 0.5
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8.5

Trust based Fusion for Robust Decisions: Optimistic Trust Model

In this section we discuss all relevant result for trust based fusion using optimistic trust
heuristic.

8.5.1

Optimal threshold

From Fig. 8.21, we obtain trust threshold Γopt for trust based fusion. We perform a trust
based fusion with different candidate thresholds Γ ranging from 0.2 to 0.8 and compare how
‘mismatch’ varies from ideal results. Fig. 8.21, shows that for very low values of potential
thresholds, there are more mismatches since most of the malicious nodes are included for
fusion. However, as we increase this threshold, malicious nodes start getting discarded and
mismatch decreases. However, when the threshold is very high (above 0.6), the mismatch
again increases as high threshold means we are also discarding the potentially honest nodes
too. Since our goal is to minimize the total average mismatch from the ideal scenario, we
notice a range of threshold values from 0.45 to 0.51, where the average mismatch is the
least for different probabilities of attack. From individual node’s perspective, the idea is
to minimize the mismatches after fusion. Hence we choose Γopt as 0.50, with the rationale
that any node having trust value equal or below 0.50 is doing atleast more harm than it
is doing good. If Γopt was 0.45, the nodes are successful in excluding majority of malicious
nodes from fusion for higher probabilities of attack but not for lower probabilities of attack
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because malicious nodes have lower trust values when they attack less aggressively. If we take
0.50 as threshold, then more malicious nodes are excluded. However, if we take Γopt = 0.45,
we might end up being less strict by allowing more malicious nodes reports in fusion.
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Figure 8.21: Optimal Threshold selection for trust based fusion

8.5.2

Fusion results for transient state: Individual node perspective

Using Γopt = 0.50, from Fig. 8.22(a) and Fig. 8.22(b), it is evident that by using trust based
fusion the nodes 10 and 23 have mismatches significantly lower than if they had blindly
fused occupancy data without trust filtration. To measure what percentage of nodes are
benefited using our framework of T BF , even at high probabilities of attack of 0.8, 90% of
the nodes have average mismatches less than 6 ( 15%) shown in Fig. 8.23. The results reflect
the effectiveness of trust based fusion over blind fusion.
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Figure 8.22: Trust based fusion for optimistic trust model with Γopt = 0.5: An individual
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8.5.3

Fusion results for the steady state: Overall network perspective

In Fig. 8.24 and Fig. 8.25, we observe that the percentage of mismatches are far less for trust
based fusion which filters out potentially dishonest nodes rather than blind fusion. This is
true for both attack strategies. For lower magnitudes of attack the network is not significantly
damaged hence they are allowed, and hence the blind fusion and trust based fusion have
almost similar mismatches. This is because we do not want to lose the cooperation that
dishonest nodes contribute when the attack magnitude is low. However, when the attack
magnitude increases, the trust values of malicious nodes fall below the desired threshold Γopt
and their false opinions get filtered out decreasing mismatches. The results from this are
indicative of the effectiveness of the proposed trust based fusion.
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Figure 8.24: Performance comparison of trust based fusion under Pattack : Steady state
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Figure 8.25: Performance comparison of trust based fusion under Iattack : Steady state

8.6

Inversion based Fusion: Utilizing Misleading Information

We simulate 100 randomly scattered nodes out of which 30% nodes are programmed to be
malicious. All nodes continuously scan 40 channels, record the signal power on each of them,
and create the binary occupancy vector which they then advertise. The malicious nodes
attack (i.e., change the bits in the channel occupancy vector) with a probability between 0.5
to 1.0. It is to be noted that lower attack probability do not significantly affect the network.

8.6.1

Log weight measurement

In Fig. 8.26, we see the difference between the average weights for all honest nodes and the
average weight for all malicious nodes. We see a significant difference between the two sets,
with honest node line well over 0 and malicious nodes below 0. As discussed earlier we see
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the malicious node’s weight on the negative y-axis and the weights of honest node on the
positive y-axis. We run the simulation for different Pattack , and observe that more aggressive
they attack, their weights and trust decrease. The observation is also true for all malicious
nodes as well as any individual malicious nodes as shown in Fig. 8.27.
3
Log Weight Value for Malicious Nodes
Log Weight Value for Honest Nodes

Average Weight Value

2
1
0
−1
−2
−3
−4
−5
0.5

0.55

0.6

0.65

0.7

0.75

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

Probability of Attack

Figure 8.26: Log weighted trust between honest and malicious nodes
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Figure 8.27: Log weighted trust over Pattack
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8.6.2

Optimal threshold for inversion based fusion schemas

In trust based fusion, we used a trust threshold of 0.50, where nodes below that value were
considered malicious and their occupancy vector was discarded from fusion. From Fig. 8.28, it
is evident that the minimum possible mismatch fraction is achieved at 0.0 for all probabilities
of attack. As we lower the threshold, more and more malicious nodes will be included in
no inversion, hence the higher number of mismatches. We show the results for mismatch
fraction over different Pattack considering different candidate weight thresholds in Fig. 8.29
and observe that the lowest mismatch fraction for all Pattack is the one that corresponds to
weight threshold of 0. From the above two observations, we can infer that for all Pattack ,
Wopt should be 0.
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Figure 8.28: Optimal threshold for invoking inversion based fusion
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Figure 8.29: Percentage of mismatches for different candidate thresholds

8.6.3

Selective inversion and complete inversion

The nodes whose weights are below or equal to 0 are considered potentially malicious node
and they are candidates for inversion schemes. Using the entire range for practical Pattack
values for selective and complete inversions, we found that for lower Pattack selective inversion
performs better as evident from Fig. 8.30. As Pattack takes higher values, the undecided channels (i.e., neither matches nor mismatches) are not taken into account in selective inversion
and hence the mismatches increase. However, for the complete inversion the reverse happens. As Pattack increases, more channels are inverted and an inverted vector of a malicious
node is closer to the actual occupancy. This is due to the gain in cooperation from even
the malicious nodes that we harness. The point where the two inversion schemes SI and
CI cross is termed as ‘crossover point’. Before the crossover point, selective inversion works
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better and after the crossover point complete inversion works better. From simulations, we
find that the crossover point occurs at Pattack = 0.65 as justified and shown in Fig. 8.31.
With the crossover point known, we are able to back calculate the threshold Wmin . Recall,
the nodes are not aware of the probability of attack launched by malicious nodes but their
weights are a reflection of the attack probability.
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Figure 8.30: Comparative study of proposed fusion schemes with Trust based Fusion; Percentage of mismatches for all Pattack

8.6.4

Threshold selection for CI and SI fusion: A combined approach

In order to examine the nature of the crossover point, we consider different densities of
malicious nodes (Pmal ) for both the fusion schemes and see whether there is a consensus on
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the crossover point. From Fig. 8.31 confirms that Pattack = 0.65 is the cross-over point for
both inversion schemes for ρmal = 0.2, 0.3 and 0.4. Though it is obvious to use an inversion
scheme based on the probability of attack, the problem is that the regular nodes would not
know the probability of attack. However, using the log-weight based trust evaluation, they
can compute the weights, wi , which indirectly captures the probability of attack. Thus, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between pattack and wimal .
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Figure 8.31: Crossover point for different malicious node densities

Table 8.1: Average Trust at Pcrossover = 0.65 for different ρmal
Malicious
Average Weight Value for
Node Density
Pattack = 0.65
0.2
-1.023909
0.3
-1.009977
0.4
-1.037043
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Figure 8.32: Combined inversion compared with Trust based and Blind Fusion

We find the average Wi for malicious nodes that corresponds to Pattack = 0.65 for each
value of ρmal (from Table 8.1) and call it Wcrossover . Interestingly, the weights for malicious
nodes at Pcrossover is almost the same. Hence we make Wcrossover = Wmin = −1.00 the
threshold which decides which inversion scheme is to be invoked. Knowing Wmin and noting
that Pattack and Wi are inversely related, we simply use selective inversion for Wi > Wmin and
complete inversion for Wi < Wmin . The result of the combined inversion fusion is compared
with blind fusion and trust based fusion in Fig. 8.32. Either way from the plot, it is apparent
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that an isolation based trusted based fusion is always the second best, and the combined
inversion based inclusive technique works better than the isolative trust based technique.

8.7

Trust based Fusion: Conservative Trust Model

For the fusion results, we use a trust threshold of 0.0 against instantaneous conservative
trust weights, to discard the information from such nodes. This approach uses a different
threshold than what was used for malicious node identification, because on each time slot
the actual realization of Pattack may be different from the mean value and does not reflect
the degree of falsification on a particular time slot. We use the trust threshold of 0, by the
same logic we chose 0.50 as threshold, when trust was bounded between 0 and 1.

8.7.1

Robust fusion results for conservative trust weights

Fig. 8.33(a), we show the performance of the proposed conservative trust based fusion model
as opposed to blind fusion, and report far less percentage of mismatches. The same also
holds true if the malicious nodes launch collaborative attacks where they agree upon select
channels. However, when Pattack is low in case of collaborative attack, the trusted fusion
gives more mismatches than blind fusion as can be observed in Fig. 8.33(b). Hence an
important conclusion is that when Pattack is low (<< 0.5), and strategy is collaborative
SSDF, trust based fusion that tries to disregard nodes based on their trust values in not an
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effective approach. This is effectively the case of selfish SSDF attacks, where magnitude of
attack is low and nodes have interest on specific channels agree upon falsification on those
channels. This gives motivation for a separate defense strategy against such nodes who
employ collaborative SSDF attack on a minority number of channels of interest. We keep
this open problem for our future work.
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Figure 8.33: Performance of conservative trust based fusion:(a) Under non-collaborative
attack (b) Under collaborative attack

8.7.2

Comparison of conservative robust fusion with existing research

In Fig. 8.34, we show that under high density of collaborative malicious nodes, majority
voting based node reputation discussed in [21], cannot defend against errors induced by
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such attacks. On the other hand our proposed trust based fusion can preserve the integrity
of cooperative sensing results in a better way.
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Figure 8.34: Comparing CTBF with majority voting based exclusion for high density collaborative attack

8.8

Trust based Channel Preference Under Selfish Collaboration

To validate the trust model and to compute the net trust for each channel, we simulate a
distributed network over an area of 3000 × 3000 m with 20 primaries; thus 20 channels. We
consider a total of 30 (honest and malicious) mobile secondary nodes. The received power
at each receiver depends on the path loss factor ω which was varied between 3 and 5. We
show the results for different nodes that belong to different parts of the network. As for the
update periodicity, we update the beliefs every 3 time slots which we refer to as a window.
The sensitivity factor λ was kept at 0.2.
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8.8.1

Trust based channel preference

We consider 40% of the nodes as selfish which collaboratively attacked the channels S =
{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19}. The channels attacked remained static over time. In Fig. 8.35,
we show the net trust of the channels sorted in an descending manner as calculated by an
honest node 12.
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Figure 8.35: Channel preference order by node 12 when ω = 3.5

As expected, the 9 channels that were attacked have significantly lower trust values
than others. For node 12, the best channel is 8 and the second best is 2. The worst channel is
19. Therefore, the fused decision on channel 8 can be trusted the most followed by 2 and so
on. The strategy for node 12 will be to check whether channel 8 can be used to communicate
with its intended receiver. If not, it will check channel 2 and so on. Our results show that for
both variants (i.e., static and dynamic) the channels that were attacked have a significantly
lower trust value than channels that were not. Moreover, for static attacks it is also possible
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to identify the channels that were selected by the adversarial group. We also show that the
proposed trust model is effective even for a high density of selfish nodes. We demonstrate
that the proposed accuracy of channel centric defense mechanism is preserved under node
mobility and various pathloss environments.

8.8.2

Channel preference with more selfish nodes

Now, we set the number of selfish nodes to 60% of the total number of nodes i.e., 18.
In Fig. 8.36(a), we show the net trust of the channels sorted in an descending manner as
calculated by the honest node 14. As per most previous works, it is difficult to distinguish
dishonest behavior when the adversary density is higher than 50% [36].
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Figure 8.36: Channel preference of node no. 14 with 18 selfish nodes: (a) For ω = 3.5 (b)
For ω = 5.0
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It is to be noted that node 14 is able to identify the 9 channels that were attacked
inspite of the increased number of selfish nodes. The trust values for those channels are even
lower– enabling a better differentiation of the channels. However, the order is different from
what was observed by node 12 because of being at a different location. Fig. 8.36(b), shows
that results hold true for a higher value of ω = 5.0.

8.8.3

Trust propagation under static selfish attacks

In Fig. 8.37, we observe how trust values evolve over time with the proposed trust update
model for static attacks. It clearly exhibits the difference between a channel that was attacked
and a channel that was not. We consider two channels: one from the attacked channel set
(i.e., 1) and another from the non-attacked channel set (i.e., 4). We plot the weighted moving
average of the net trust after every 3 time slots. As time progresses, we see a clear difference
in the trust values for channels 1 and 4.
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Figure 8.37: Net trust for attacked and not-attacked channels
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14

8.8.4

Effect of fraction of selfish nodes

We investigate how the trust values for channels vary with different fractions of selfish nodes.
In Fig. 8.38, we show the average trust values for attacked channel set and the non-attacked
channel set, for increasing number of attackers. As expected, there is hardly any change
on channels that are not attacked, whereas, the average trust value for the channels that
were attacked decreases. This result is in contrast with the commonly used voting schemes
or Kullback-Leibler divergence based defense models that fail to detect anomaly when the
number of attackers is more than 50%.
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Figure 8.38: Average trust with increasing number of selfish nodes
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8.8.5

Trust variation under dynamic selfish attacks

To prove that our model is able to capture the frequent changes in the attacked channel
set, we vary the attacked channel set every 10 time slots on an average. We show how the
net trust is updated for two specific channels (12 and 9) in Fig. 8.39(a) and Fig. 8.39(b)
respectively.
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Figure 8.39: Net trust updates for dynamic attacks (a) Channel 12 (b) Channel 9

Note, the plots are shown in time windows (3 time slots = 1 window). These two
representative channels (9 and 12) were intermittently and randomly chosen by the coalition
of selfish nodes. Trust of channel 12 starts with a high value for 10 time windows, but then
attacked consistently for next 15 windows (i.e., 45 time slots); hence its trust exhibits a steady
decrease. After that channel 12, is intermittently chosen for attack, which causes the rapid
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fluctuations of the trusts values. Channel 9 is not attacked for 22 windows then attacked for
a few windows. Hence, its trust value is initially high followed by a sudden decrease which
stays unchanged for 4 windows and then increases for the remaining windows.

8.9

Generlized Bayesian Framework for Quantifying Decision Reliability

We simulate a generic centralized system with 100 nodes. Inputs from all nodes are monitored by an imperfect monitoring mechanism that produces three possible outcomes. The
probability of detection, Pdet , is varied to capture its effects on decision reliability.
An adversary attacks and compromises different sets of inputs over time. The number
of inputs compromised vary over time slot; although the long-term average of the number of
inputs compromised, denoted by Pa , remains the same. We study the decision reliability for
different values of Pa , and plot instantaneous and moving average of decision reliability. We
first present the results for an optimistic system and then for a more conservative system.

8.9.1

Optimistic decision reliability: Instantaneous and average

In Fig. 8.40, we plot both the instantaneous and average decision reliability for the optimistic
reliability model when the adversary launches attacks with Pa = 0.5. We observe that the
decision reliability fluctuates over time. As expected, with sufficient observations, the moving
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average of decision reliability converges to a steady state reliability equal to 1 − Pa which in
this case is 0.5.
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Figure 8.40: Instantaneous and average decision reliability with Pa = 0.50 and Pdet = 0.8

8.9.2

Decision reliability and entropy

In Fig. 8.41, we plot steady state decision reliability with increasing Pa and for two different
values of Pdet . The plots show a steady decrease of decision reliability values for Pdet 0.5 and
0.9. Recall, with different Pdet the values of average decision reliability may differ but the
relation between Rso and Pa does not change with change in Pdet unlike Rsc . This is because
inputs chosen by the adversary is uniformly random. The conservative reliability Rsc , also
falls linearly with increasing Pa , but the slope or rate of this change varies for the different
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values of Pdet . This is because the conservative model does not account for the undecided
ones. Hence a lower value of Pdet yields a lower reliability value than a higher value of Pdet .
Furthermore, Fig. 8.42 shows the entropy values of the system under the same set
of Pdet . This shows that a system with higher Pdet has a lower uncertainty on the decision
reliability estimate for all values of Pa . This is useful when we use optimistic system reliability
which uses a fraction of undecided ones to contribute to the final reliability value.
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Figure 8.41: Optimistic and Conservative Reliability over Pa for different Pdet
In Fig. 8.43, we show how entropy changes with increasing probability of attack. As
time evolves and Pdet improves, the uncertainty (i.e., entropy) associated with the decision
reliability decreases indicating increased confidence on the reliability values.
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Figure 8.42: Entropy over different values of Pa
8.9.3

Decision reliability with time variant Pa

Some adversaries may choose to attack short-term with low or high attack probability;
however, maintaining the long-term average value of Pa . For example, an adversary attacks
less initially conserving its attack resources for future and eventually attacking more (under
favorable conditions). In Fig. 8.44, we investigate how the proposed model behaves in such
cases. We consider an adversary with Pa = 0.5. The first 500 slots are attacked less and
next 500 slots are compensated by attacking more. We observe that decision reliability
progressively moves towards the expected reliability, although no strict convergence on the
decision reliability is achieved.
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Figure 8.43: Conservative decision entropy with incremental increase of Pdet
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Figure 8.44: Decision Reliability under Non-Uniformly distributed Pa = 0.50
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8.9.4

Conservative reliability model

In Fig. 8.45, we plot the changes in conservative decision reliability, over time with gradual
increase in Pdet . As mentioned earlier, if the system evolves into more accurate monitoring,
the decision reliability also improves, although Rs 6= 1 − Pa . Thus, having a conservative
decision reliability is not unfair, given that risk associated with it is high, and there is scope
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for improving reliability when detection accuracy increases.
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Figure 8.45: Conservative decision reliability with increasing Pdet
Through simulation experiments, we showed how the decision reliability changes with
attack probability which also affects the detection accuracy of the underlying monitoring
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mechanism. Using entropy, we provided a way to evaluate the certainty of the reliability calculation. Finally, we showed how the decision reliability decreases when the attack
probability increases.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation addressed the vulnerabilities of cooperative spectrum sensing in DSA networks and propoased techniques to mitigate them. We show how malicious and selfish nodes
can launch a variety of attacks. In that regard, we discussed various attack models including probabilistic multi-channel SSDF, collaborative SSDF, on-off SSDF attacks and their
variants.
In order to quantify trustworthiness of nodes, we proposed an anomaly monitoring
scheme is effective in capturing anomalies using mismatches while also accommodating uncertainty because a honest node may be legitimately outside the reception range of primary.
Uisng the invert sequence the proposed scheme, we show how we can utilize misleading
information under certain conditions by intelligent flipping of data shared. We propse an
optimistic trust model quantifying trust for a low risk system which uses instantaneous trust
values while fusing spectrum occupancy data from neighbors. We provide a way to rank
nodes based on their trustworthiness and disregard reports from nodes whose trust values
fall below a threshold. While instantaneous trust values are useful for robust fusion from
an individual node’s perspective, long-term average trustworthiness for a node maintained
and updated over time as seen by all neighbors of a node (known as reputation) is useful
for network administrative tasks like isolating nodes from a network or taking other pros179

ecutable actions. We observe significant improvement in the performance of trust based
fusion over blind majority fusion for all practical values of magnitude of attack and for both
collaborative and non-collaborative attacks. Then we propose a conservative trust model
that has the ability to cope with strict risk attitude, variation of evidence due to varying
pathloss environment, different levels of aggression and uncertainties in the monitoring evidence. Using support vector machines over several training sets, we could classify malicious
nodes more accurately than some existing methods that use pairwise entropy or majority
voting based exclusion. The conservative trust based fusion also improves accuracy in a
similar way as the optimistic trust based fusion. The proposed asymmetric moving average
model is able to deal with on-off attacks; however, sometimes honest reports may be altered
due to noise. Our results from asymmetric moving average for trust maintenance shows we
can differentiate between on-off attacks and noise. We observe that malicious nodes take
longer to improve their trust than nodes experiencing noise even when malicious nodes show
good behavior for a very long time. Apart from node centric approaches we argue the need
for a channel centric approach towards identifying the trustworthiness of fused decision on
each channel. In this regard, we propose a channel centric Bayesian inference framework
that helps rank channels. We also show that the proposed framework is generic enough to
model decision reliability in any cooperative decision making system.
Overall, this dissertation improves upon and extends our understanding on the vulnerabilities of DSA networks. This is the first work to investigate multi-channel collaborative
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SSDF attacks and provide novel strategies to defend them. This study provides key insights
on the design of DSA networks with operational assurance under adversarial situations.
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